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Abstract
Tabulation audits for an election provide statistical
evidence that a reported contest outcome is “cor-
rect” (meaning that the tabulation of votes was
properly performed), or else the tabulation audit
determines the correct outcome.
Stark [51] proposed risk-limiting tabulation
audits for this purpose; such audits are effective
and are beginning to be used in practice in Col-
orado [38] and other states.
We expand the study of election audits based
on Bayesian methods. Such Bayesian audits use
a slightly different approach first introduced by
Rivest and Shen in 2012 [44]. (The risk-limiting
audits proposed by Stark are “frequentist” rather
than Bayesian in character.)
We first provide a simplified presentation of
Bayesian tabulation audits. Suppose an election
has been run and the tabulation of votes reports a
given outcome. A Bayesian tabulation audit begins
by drawing a random sample of the votes in that
contest, and tallying those votes. It then considers
what effect statistical variations of this tally have
on the contest outcome. If such variations almost
always yield the previously-reported outcome, the
audit terminates, accepting the reported outcome.
Otherwise the audit is repeated with an enlarged
sample.
Bayesian audits are attractive because they work
with any method for determining the winner (such
as ranked-choice voting).
We then show how Bayesian audits may be ex-
tended to handle more complex situations, such as
auditing contests that span multiple jurisdictions,
or are otherwise “stratified.”
We highlight the auditing of such multiple-
jurisdiction contests where some of the jurisdictions
have an electronic cast vote record (CVR) for each
cast paper vote, while the others do not. Complex
situations such as this may arise naturally when
some counties in a state have upgraded to new
equipment, while others have not. Bayesian audits
are able to handle such situations in a straightfor-
ward manner.
We also discuss the benefits and relevant consid-
erations for using Bayesian audits in practice.
Keywords: elections, auditing, post-election au-
dits, risk-limiting audit, tabulation audit, bayesian
audit.
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1 Introduction and motivation
We assume that you, the reader, are interested in
methods for assuring the integrity of election out-
comes.
For example, you may be a voter or a member
of a political or watchdog organization with con-
cerns that hackers may have manipulated the vot-
ing machines to rig the election. Or, you might be
an election official who worries that election equip-
ment was erroneously mis-programmed so as to give
incorrect results. Perhaps you are a journalist or a
statistician who is concerned that the official elec-
tion results do not match well with exit polls. Or,
you might be a concerned citizen who fears that too
much talk of “rigging elections” and “incorrect elec-
tion outcomes” will diminish citizens’ confidence in
elections and democracy, possibly increasing voter
apathy and decreasing voter turnout.
The main purpose of this note is to explain and
extend certain methods for performing “tabulation
audits” that provide assurance that election out-
comes are correct (more precisely, they are the re-
sult of correctly tabulating the available paper bal-
lots).
With a well-designed and well-implemented au-
dit, everyone can relax a bit regarding the correct-
ness of an election outcome, and more attention can
be paid to other concerns, such as the qualifications
of the candidates and the important issues of the
day.
Expository goal Our first goal is an expository
one: to present Bayesian audits in a simple man-
ner, so that you may see the essential character and
approach of these methods, even if you are not a
statistician or a computer scientist.
As some of the details are somewhat technical,
we’ll probably fail to completely achieve this goal.
Nonetheless, we hope that you will gain an in-
creased understanding of and appreciation for these
methods.
We thus defer all mathematical notation, equa-
tions, and such to the appendices.
(I must admit that presenting the audit meth-
ods this way is a challenge! I hope that doing so
will increase readability and accessibility for many.
However, the result is wordier and longer than a
concise mathematical presentation would be.)
Extensions Our second objective is to provide
some extensions of the basic methods. These ex-
tensions concern elections where a single contest
may span several jurisdictions. For example, a U.S.
Senate race in a state may span many counties.
Bayesian methods, as extended here, allow election
officials to comfortably audit such contests, even
when the various jurisdictions may have different
equipment and evidence types. As an example,
some counties might have an electronic cast vote
record (CVR) for each paper vote cast, while oth-
ers do not.
1.1 Organization
This paper is organized as follows.
• Section 2 defines standard terminology about
elections.
• Section 3 provides an overview of the guiding
philisophy here: elections should provide ev-
idence that outcomes are correct, and audits
should check that reported outcomes actually
are supported by such evidence.
• Section 4 gives a general introduction to tab-
ulation audits, including statistical and risk-
limiting tabulation audits.
• Section 5 defines the “risk” of running an audit,
giving both the frequentist and the Bayesian
definitions.
• Section 6 recaps the Bayesian audit method
of Rivest and Shen [44], designed for single-
jurisdiction elections.
• Extensions of the basic Bayesian audit method
for handling contests spanning multiple juris-
dictions are described in Section 7.
• Section 8 gives some variants of the basic
method.
• Section 9 provides some discussion.
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• Related work is described in Section 10.
• Mathematical notation and details are given in
the Appendices.
1.2 Motivation
This note is motivated in part by election audits
performed in Colorado for the November 2017 elec-
tions.
Running an audit may seem daunting, but we
believe the complexities are manageable. Statistical
methods can make running the audit considerably
faster than tabulating the ballots in the first place—
often by several orders of magnitude.
And of course we believe that audits are worth
any extra effort that might be required—ensuring
that elections produce the correct election outcome
is essential to a democracy!
2 Preliminaries
This section provides definitions for standard no-
tions regarding an election: contests, ballots, out-
comes, and so on. A reader already familiar with
elections and standard election terminology might
skip ahead to Section 3.
2.1 Elections, contests, and outcomes
We assume an election consisting of a number of
contests.
The main purpose of the election is to determine
a contest outcome for each of the contests.
A contest may take one of several typical forms.
1. A proposition or referendum is a simple
yes/no question, such as whether a school
bond should be approved. The contest out-
come is just “yes” or “no.”
2. A single-winner contest specifies a number
of candidates, one of whom will become the
winner. The contest outcome is the winner.
3. A multi-winner contest specifies a number
of candidates, of which a designated number
will be elected. For example, the contest may
determine which three candidates will become
City Councilors. The contest outcome is the
set of candidates elected.
4. A representation contest (usually for pro-
portional representation) elects represen-
tatives to an elected body. For proportional
representation the number of members from a
given party who are elected is approximately
proportional to the number of votes received by
that party. The contest outcome is the specifi-
cation of how many representatives from each
party are elected.
Contests may take other forms or take variations
of the above forms. For example, it may not be
necessary for all candidates to be pre-specified; a
voter may be able to write-in the name of a desired
candidate.
For this note, the form of the contest and the
form of the contest outcome is not so relevant;
Bayesian methods work for contests of any form.
2.2 Ballots
Each eligible voter may cast a single ballot in the
election, specifying her choices (votes) for the con-
tests in which she is eligible to vote.
A voter may be eligible to vote in some contests
but not in other contests. Perhaps only voters in a
city may vote for mayor of that city.
Typically, the voter is provided with an un-
marked paper ballot that lists only the contests for
which she is eligible to vote. In some jurisdictions,
a voter may be able to vote using a machine with
a touch-screen interface.
The set of contests for which a voter is eligible to
vote (which are those listed on her ballot) is called
the ballot style for her ballot.
In this note, we distinguish the notion of a vote,
which is a choice expressed for a single contest,
and a ballot, which provides a choice for every
contest for which the voter is eligible to vote.
This terminological choice gives rise to some
other slightly nonstandard terms. We may refer
to a paper ballot when we wish to talk about the
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entire ballot and all contests on it, but use the term
paper vote when we are referring to the portion
of a paper ballot for a particular contest.
2.3 Votes and write-ins
For each contest on her ballot, a voter may express
her vote (that is, her choice for that contest) by
making indications on her paper ballot or interact-
ing with the voting machine.
Standard choices. A vote typically specifies one
of a few standard “pre-qualified choices” for that
contest, such as the announced candidate from a
particular party.
Write-in votes. Alternatively, a vote may spec-
ify a “write-in” choice—one that was not given on
the ballot as an available option.
In some jurisdictions, a valid write-in vote must
be for a choice that has been “pre-qualified” (such
as by having enough signatures collected in support
of that choice). In other jurisdictions, there may be
no restrictions on write-in votes.
We ignore here the issue of write-in candidates,
by assuming that any choice made by a voter was
for a pre-qualified choice. Equivalently, the set
of pre-qualified choices is deemed equal to the set
of actually pre-qualified choices plus any write-in
choices made by any voter.
Undervotes, Overvotes, and Invalid votes.
A vote may be an undervote (not enough or no
candidates selected), an overvote (too many can-
didates selected), or invalid—for example, it may
include extraneous marks or writing outside of the
specified target areas.
See [59] for amusing examples of voter-marked
ballots from the Minnesota 2008 U.S. Senate race.
Candidates. The choices that could actually
win a contest are called “candidates;” other
choices (such as “undervote”) are called “non-
candidates.”
Preferential voting. Some contests may use
“preferential voting,” where a voter’s “choice”
has structure: it is an ordered list of the candidates,
from most-preferred to least preferred.
Each ballot is complete. We assume that each
ballot specifies a choice for each contest it contains.
Assumption 1 [Ballot completeness.] We as-
sume that each voter’s ballot provides a vote (pos-
sibly a non-candidate choice such as “’overvote” or
“undervote”) for each contest for which that voter
is eligible to vote.
2.4 Paper ballots
Using voter-verified paper ballots is an excellent
means of achieving software independence, since the
votes on the cast ballots can always be recounted
by hand to determine the correct contest outcomes.
(See Section 3.2.) A manual recount may typically
be done with no software whatsoever (or perhaps
only with generic software available from many in-
dependent sources, such as spreadsheet software).
Assumption 2 [Paper ballots.] We assume that
the ballots cast by voters are paper ballots on
which their votes for each contest were recorded and
(potentially) verified by the voters.
In some jurisdictions, the voter may use a ballot-
marking device to produce an appropriately
marked paper ballot. Such a device contains a
touch-screen interface and a printer; it is really just
a “fancy pencil,” but it may be easier to use, espe-
cially by voters with disabilities. A ballot-marking
device also produces ballot markings that are clean
and precise, in contrast with the huge variety of
marks a voter may make with a pencil (see Tib-
betts [59]).
Effective tabulation audits have as a foundation
the paper ballots cast in the election.
Assumption 3 [Paper ballots are the ballot of
record.] Paper votes are the “ground truth” for a
contest; a full and correct manual count of the paper
votes for a contest gives (by definition) the correct
data for computing the actual (or true) outcome
for that contest.
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For this assumption to be reasonable, a voter
must have been able to verify that the paper ballot
accurately represents her choices.
Assumption 4 [Voter-verifiable paper bal-
lots.] We assume that every voter has been able
to examine her paper ballot before it is cast, to
verify that her paper ballot correctly represents her
choices, and to change or correct any errors found.
We say that such paper ballots have been veri-
fied by the voter, even though some voters might
have made at most cursory efforts on the verifica-
tion. Such voter-verified paper ballots are the best
evidence available for the choices made by the voter.
The notion of a “full and correct manual count”
is of course an idealized notion—in practice people
make errors and a manual count of paper votes may
include such errors.
Nonetheless, in most states a full manual recount
of all cast paper votes yields, after any necessary
interpretations or adjudications of ambiguous or
confusing ballots, the “correct” (or at least legally
binding) outcome.
We take the notion of a full manual count, imper-
fect as it is, as the definition of what the “correct”
outcome is.
2.5 Vote sequences and ballot sequences
We are interested in collections of votes and collec-
tions of ballots. We find it convenient to think of
such a collection as arranged in a sequence, so we’ll
use the terms “vote sequence” or “ballot sequence”
to refer to such a collection, although the order of
votes or ballots in such a sequence doesn’t really
matter much.
We thus use the term vote sequence to denote
a sequence of votes. For example, we might have a
vote sequence for all votes cast in Utah in 2016 for
U.S. President.
In some voting literature, and in previous
work [44], a vote sequence is called a profile. We
use “vote sequence” instead for clarity.
We prefer the term “sequence” because a se-
quence may contain repeated elements (votes for
the same candidate). This is in contrast to the no-
tion of a mathematical “set,”, which may not con-
tain repeated elements.
The ordering of votes within a vote sequence is
fixed but arbitrary. The ordering might or might
not, for example, correspond to the order in which
the paper ballots were cast or scanned. We do not
assume that the order of votes in a vote sequence
is in any way random.
We use the term ballot sequence to refer to a
sequence of ballots. Recall that a “vote” is specific
to a single contest, while a “ballot” records a choice
for every contest for which a voter is eligible.
As we shall see, having the ballots or votes ar-
ranged in a sequence will facilitate a key operation
of an audit: picking a random element of the se-
quence.
To begin, the reader may assume that a vote se-
quence contains all and only those votes cast for a
given contest. Later on, in Section 7, we consider
more complicated but realistic scenarios where the
votes for a given contest may be arranged into two
or more sequences, and/or may appear in only some
portion of a sequence.
2.6 Scanners
We assume that each paper ballot is scanned by
an optical scanner device after it is cast.
Scanners are used because they provide effi-
ciency; they are able to interpret and count ballots
much more quickly than people can do by hand.
However, the use of scanners introduces technol-
ogy and complexity into the tabulation process.
At minimum, a scanner should produce a sum-
mary of the votes it has scanned, giving the total
number of votes seen that were cast for each choice
in each race.
For use in comparison-based audits (see Sec-
tion 4.6), the scanner should also produce an elec-
tronic record (the cast vote record) for each vote
on each ballot.
For an overview of optical scanning of paper bal-
lots, see Jones [22] and Wikipedia [68].
We also say that ballots are scanned to determine
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the reported vote for each contest on the ballot.
The reported vote for a contest on a ballot may
not be equal to the actual vote for that contest on
the ballot, defined as what a hand-to-eye examina-
tion of the contest on that ballot by a person would
reveal. 1
In the absence of errors, we would expect the re-
ported vote for a contest on a ballot and the corre-
sponding actual vote for that contest on that ballot
to be equal.
(See Section 7.2 for a way to handle contests
spanning several jurisdictions, where different ju-
risdictions may have different tabulation equipment
methods. For example, some jurisdictions may have
equipment that produces per-ballot CVRs, while
other jurisdiction may have equipment that reports
only aggregate per-scanner per-contest totals.)
Precinct-count. It is often the case that a bal-
lot is scanned as the voter casts it; such a process
is called precinct-count optical scan (PCOS).
An advantage of PCOS is that the scanner may
inform the voter if her ballot contains overvotes,
undervotes, or other invalid markings, and give her
an opportunity to correct such errors before casting
her ballot. The “Help America Vote Act of 2002” [9,
Sec. 301(a)(1)(A)] mandates providing voters with
such an opportunity for in-precinct voters.
Central-count. In other cases, ballots are col-
lected in a central location and scanned there
with a high-speed scanner; such a process is called
central-count optical scan (CCOS). Mail-in
ballots are typically counted this way.
Remade Mail-in ballots. A little-known fact is
that mail-in ballots often need to be copied by hand
(“re-made”) in order to be scannable, as folding the
ballot to fit in an envelope may yield creases that
confuse the scanner. An audit based on hand exam-
ination of paper ballots should be sure to audit the
original mailed-in ballot, not the re-made version.
1For reference, previous work [44] referred to the reported
vote as the “reported ballot type” and the actual vote as the
“actual ballot type;” that paper focussed on single-contest
elections.
2.7 Tallies
A tally for a vote sequence for a contest specifies
how many votes there are for each possible
choice. For example, a tally might specify:
Candidate Tally
Jones 234
Smith 3122
Berman 43
Undervote 2
The reported tally for a contest for a cast vote
sequence gives the frequency of each possible choice
in the sequence, as reported by the scanner.
The actual tally for a contest for a cast vote
sequence gives the true frequency of each possible
choice in the sequence, as would be revealed by
a manual examination of the cast paper bal-
lots.
It is convenient here to work primarily with tal-
lies, rather than with vote sequences.
Tallying for preferential voting. When pref-
erential voting is used, a choice is an order-
ing of the candidates (given in decreasing order
of preference), so the tally counts how many votes
there are for each ordering that appear in at least
one cast vote. For example, for a three-candidate
race a tally might give:
Candidate Ordering Tally
Jones Smith Berman 234
Jones Berman Smith 1
Smith Jones Berman 2192
Smith Berman Jones 344
Berman Smith Jones 19
Invalid 2
Voteshares We define the voteshare of a choice
as the fraction of votes cast having that choice, in
the vote sequence being considered. The voteshares
must add up to 1.
2.8 Contest outcomes and contest out-
come determination rules
A contest outcome is determined by applying a
contest outcome determination rule (more
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concisely, an outcome rule) to the cast vote se-
quence of votes cast by eligible voters for that con-
test.
Since we assume that an outcome rule depends
only on the tally for a vote sequence, rather than
the vote sequence directly, we may think of the in-
put for a outcome rule as either the vote sequence
or, equivalently and more simply, its vote tally.
In the voting literature, a contest outcome deter-
mination rule is often called a social choice func-
tion, an electoral system, or a voting method.
Wikipedia provides overviews [65, 64] of many
different outcome rules and their properties.
In the United States, most contest outcomes are
determined by the plurality rule: the contest out-
come (winner) corresponds to the choice voted for
by the most voters. This rule is also called the
“first past the post” rule.
Another simple outcome rule is “approval.”
With approval voting, each voter votes for all can-
didates that she approves of; the outcome is the
most-approved candidate. See Brams [5] for more
discussion of approval voting.
The literature contains many outcome rules for
preferential voting, where a voter’s vote lists can-
didates in decreasing order of preference. Instant
Runoff Voting (IRV) [13] is an example, as is Tide-
man’s “Ranked Pairs” method [60] (which arguably
has better properties than IRV).
Outcomes depend on tallies. As noted earlier,
oOutcome rules should be independent of the or-
der of votes in a cast vote sequence—the outcome
should depend only on the number of votes cast
for each possible choice.
Assumption 5 [Outcomes are independent of
vote order.] We assume that outcome rules de-
pend upon the tally of votes of an input vote se-
quence, and not upon the order of votes in that se-
quence.
Outcome rules typically do also not depend on
the number of undervotes, overvotes, or invalid
votes. It is almost as if those votes were not cast.
However, the manual interpretation of paper ballots
that occurs during an audit may determine that
some ballots that the scanner classified as under-
votes were in fact valid votes for a candidate, etc.,
so the tally resulting from an audit may differ in de-
tail from the original scanner-produced tally, while
having the same total.
Ties An outcome rule may confront the problem
of having to break a “tie,” either for the final con-
test outcome, or for some comparison step in the
middle of its computation. Ties may be rare, but
an outcome rule needs to plan for their resolutio
should they occur. With a method such as IRV, the
tabulation may need to resolve a number of ties dur-
ing its computation, as it may happen more than
once that two or more candidates are tied as can-
didates for elimination (and how one resolves these
ties may affect the eventual contest outcome).
In practice it is common that if two or more can-
didates are tied to be the winner of a contest, elec-
tion officials resolve the tie “by lot”—using a coin,
die, or a card drawn randomly from a hat. See
Munroe [29] for an informative and amusing dis-
cussion of ties.
For Bayesian audits, we shall require more: all of
the “tie-breaking” decisions must be made in ad-
vance.
Assumption 6 An outcome rule shall be capable
of accepting in advance a way of resolving any
ties that may arise.
The reason for this requirement is that Bayesian
audits run the outcome rule many times on slightly
different (“fuzzed”) vote tallies. During this com-
putation, ties may arise that were not present
during the original tabulation; the Bayesian audit
needs to resolve these ties without stopping to ask
election official for additional dice rolls or the like.
How can election officials specify in advance how
any potential tie should be broken? One simple
method is for election officials in the beginning to
successively draw cards from a hat, where each card
names one candidate. This procedure produces a
random ordering of the candidate names. Any ties
can be broken by reference to this random order.
However tie-breaking is done, the tie-breaking
information for the audit should be consis-
tent with any tie-breaking that was done
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during the original tabulation. Otherwise the
audit might fail to confirm the reported contest out-
come. I would support the suggested method of
using a single random ordering of the candidates
to break all ties, including ties that might occur
during the original tabulation. This random order-
ing might be produced by drawing names from a
hat before the initial tabulation is done; the same
random ordering would be used then both for the
initial tabulation and for the audit.
The outcome rule should depend only on its input
tally and on the provided tie-breaking information.
In particular, it should not be randomized.
Assumption 7 [Deterministic outcome
rules.] We assume that the outcome rule is
deterministic and depends only on the supplied
vote tally and supplied tie-breaking information.
2.9 Reported contest outcome(s)
After all the cast paper ballots are scanned, the
outcome rules for each contest are applied to pro-
cess the resulting electronic records to provide the
initial or reported contest outcome for each
contest.
By “resulting electronic records” we mean the
cast vote records for CVR collections or collection-
level tallies for non-CVR collections.
By “reported contest outcome” here we do not
mean a tentative result announced to the press on
the evening after the election. Such a tenative re-
sult might not include all of the provisional ballots
whose status has yet to be resolved. (Provisional
ballots were mandated by the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 [9] as a means of helping voters whose
eligibility status was not clear on Election Day; such
voters cast a “provisional ballot” that may be cast
on behalf of the voter later, once the eligibility of
the voter is ascertained and approved.)
Such a tentative result also might not include
mail-in ballots that were mailed before Election
Day but which have not yet been received.
Instead, by “reported contest outcome” we mean
a contest outcome that is allegedly correct and final,
based on the electronic cast vote records for all cast
votes, including those for provisional ballots and
for late-arriving vote-by-mail ballots (if such late-
arriving ballots are eligible by law to be counted).
A reported contest outcome should be equal to
the actual election outcome for that contest unless
there are material errors or omissions in the tabu-
lation of the votes.
The reported contest outcome will be certified
by election officials as correct and final, unless (per-
haps through an audit) the reported outcome is de-
termined to be incorrect.
2.10 Ballot storage
Definition 1 A collection of (cast) paper ballots
is a group of paper ballots with a common history
and under common management, and which may
serve as a population for sampling purposes.
We might think of a collection as “all paper bal-
lots cast in Arapahoe County” or “all paper ballots
received by mail in Middlesex precinct number 5.”
Once ballots in a collection are scanned, they are
organized into batches and stored in a common lo-
cation. Because randomly selected ballots need to
be retrieved later for an audit, the storage proce-
dure needs to be carefully executed and clearly doc-
umented.
3 Evidence-based elections
The overall purpose of an election is to produce
both
1. correct outcomes for each contest and
2. evidence that those contest outcomes are cor-
rect.
The evidence should be sufficiently compelling to
convince the losers (and their supporters) that they
lost the election fair and square. The evidence
should also provide assurance to the public that the
reported election outcomes are correct.
The evidence that contest outcomes are correct
may have several parts, including evidence that
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1. the election was properly planned and man-
aged,
2. all eligible voters who desired to vote were
able to cast ballots representing their intended
votes,
3. no ineligible person or entity was able to cast
ballots,
4. all cast ballots were counted,
5. the counting (tabulation) of the ballots was
correctly performed.
See Stark and Wagner’s paper “Evidence-Based
Elections” [50] for a more detailed discussion, in-
cluding a description of “compliance audits” for
checking many aspects of the above list.
A well-run election may thus include a number of
“audits” for checking the integrity of the evidence
gathered and the consistency of the evidence with
the reported contest outcomes.
In this paper we focus on tabulation audits,
which check that the interpretation of the ballots
and their tabulation to produce a tally gives the
correct outcome(s).
3.1 Voting technology
Where technology goes, voting systems try to fol-
low.
The history of technology for voting has been
surveyed by Jones [23], Jones et al [24], and Salt-
man [47].
Sometimes the tendency of voting system designs
to follow technology trends can lead to insecure pro-
posals, as with proposals for “voting over the Inter-
net.” [14, 17].
A major (almost insurmountable) problem with
electronic and internet voting is their general in-
ability to produce credible evidence trails.
Computers are good at counting, but they are not
good at producing evidence that they have counted
correctly.
3.2 Software independence.
The notion of “software independence” has been
proposed by Rivest and Wack [46, 40] as a another
way of characterizing how software-dependent sys-
tems can fail.
Definition 2 A voting system is said to be “soft-
ware independent” if an undetected change or er-
ror in its software can not cause an undetectable
change or error in an election outcome.
With a software-dependent voting system, one’s
confidence in an election outcome is no better than
one’s confidence that the election software is cor-
rect, untampered, and installed correctly.
Given the complexity of modern software, the ex-
istence of foreign states acting as adversaries to our
elections, and the lack of methods in most voting
systems for telling that the correct software is even
installed, software independence seems a manda-
tory requirement for secure voting system design.
The use of paper ballots provides one means of
achieving software independence. We thus restrict
attention here to the use of paper ballots.
Paper ballots provide voters with a software-
independent means of verifying that their ballots
correctly represent their intended votes, and pro-
vide a durable record of voters choices that may be
audited.
4 Tabulation audits
This section gives an overview of tabulation au-
dits.
A tabulation audit checks that the evidence
produced is sufficiently convincing that the re-
ported contest outcomes are correct (that is, the
result of correctly tabulating the available paper
ballots). It checks, among other things, that the
election outcome has not been affected by complex
technology used during the tabulation (which might
be subject to mis-programming or malicious modi-
fication).
Verified Voting [61] gives an excellent and concise
overview of tabulation audits, including details of
the audit requirements (if any) in each U.S. state.
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The inputs for a tabulation audit include:
• [Ballot manifests] A ballot manifest for each
relevant collection of paper ballots.
• [CVRs (optional)] Per-ballot cast vote
records (optional) for some collections of pa-
per ballots.
• [Paper ballots] The actual cast paper ballots
for each collection.
• [Tie-breaking information] Auxiliary tie-
breaking information used to break any ties
that may have occured during tabulation, or
that might occur during the audit.
• [Reported winner(s)] The reported win-
ner(s) for each contest.
The outputs for a tabulation audit include:
• A decision as to whether to accept or reject
the reported winner(s) as correct for the au-
dited contest(s).
• Detailed information about the audit itself, al-
lowing others to verify the procedures used and
decisions reached.
4.1 Tabulation errors
By “errors” here we primarily mean ballots whose
reported votes are different than their actual votes.
We also count arithmetic mistakes as “errors.”
4.2 Ballot manifests
A statistical tabulation audit is based on the use
of sampling: a random sample of the cast paper
ballots is selected and examined by hand.
In order to perform such sampling, the audit
needs to know the population to be sampled—the
universe of cast paper ballots relevant to the con-
test(s) being audited.
A ballot manifest provides a description of the
collection of paper ballots to be sampled from.
Definition 3 A ballot manifest for a collection
of cast paper ballots is a document describing the
physical organization and storage of the paper bal-
lots in the collection. It specifies how many paper
ballots are in the collection, and how to find each
one.
For example, a ballot manifest might say,
“The ballots for the November 2016 elec-
tion in Smith County are stored in 201
boxes, each containing 50 ballots except
the last one, which stores 17. Boxes are
labeled B1 to B201, and are in City Hall,
Room 415.”
The location of one of the 10017 ballots is just
the box number and the position within the box
(e.g. “fifth from the top of box 43”).
The ballot manifest is a critical component of the
audit, as it defines and describes the universe of
paper ballots for the election. Every ballot cast in
the election should be accounted for in the ballot
manifest.
Because of its critical importance to the audit,
the ballot manifest should be produced in a trust-
worthy manner.
For example, it would not be good practice to de-
rive the ballot manifest from the same equipment
that is producing the cast ballot records for the
ballots. The correctness and integrity of the bal-
lot manifest is as important as the integrity of the
paper ballots themselves.
A “ballot accounting” process, part of a
“compliance audit” [50], performs various checks
to ensure that the ballot manifest is accurate.
Some modern scanners print a unique ballot ID
number on each paper ballot as it is scanned.
The scanner may generate these ballot ID (pseudo-
)randomly (see Section 4.9) to avoid potential pri-
vacy concerns that could arise if they were gener-
ated sequentially. The ID becomes part of the elec-
tronic cast vote record for that ballot, and can be
used to confirm that the correct ballot has been
found in the audit. While such IDs are part of the
cast vote records, they should probably not be part
of the ballot manifest, as they are produced by po-
tentially suspect machines.
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4.3 Cast vote records (CVRs) and cast
ballot records (CBRs)
A modern scanner usually produces an electronic
cast ballot record (CBR) for each cast paper
ballot it scans.
We use the term cast vote record (CVR) to
refer to an electronic record of a voter’s choice for
a single contest, and the term cast ballot record
(CBR) to refer to an electronic record of a voter’s
choices on all contests on her ballot.
Definition 4 A cast vote record (CVR) for a
contest on a ballot reports the vote (choice) made by
the voter for that contest on that ballot. The CVR
may alternatively indicate that the voter made an
undervote, or an invalid choice (such as an over-
vote, or illegal marking). For contests using pref-
erential voting, the CVR may specify the voter’s
“choice” as an ordered list, in decreasing order of
voter’s preference, of the candidates for that con-
test.
Definition 5 An electronic cast ballot record
(CBR) for a paper ballot contains a cast vote
record (CVR) for each contest on the ballot. The
CBR also specifies the storage location of the cor-
responding paper ballot.
The term “cast ballot record” seems not to be
in use, although “cast vote record” is. It may be
useful to distinguish these notions.
Scanners may scramble order. An important
question about a voting system is whether the bal-
lots are kept and stored in the order in which they
were scanned. If so, it should be easy to find the
CBR corresponding to the ballot stored in a given
physical location.
If the ballots are not kept and stored in the or-
der in which they are scanned, it may be infeasible
to find the electronic CBR for a particular paper
ballot. In this case, the electronic records (CBRs)
may be useless for the audit, and the auditor may be
forced to use a less-efficient “ballot-polling audit”
rather than the more-efficient “comparison audit.”
See Section 4.6. Or else the auditor may decide to
rescan all of the paper ballots (!); a so-called “tran-
sitive audit.” (See Brentschneider et al. [6, p. 10]).
Scanners may not produce CVRs. Some
scanners do not produce CVRs, but only a tally for
the contests on the ballots it has scanned. If CVRs
are produced for a collection of paper ballots, we
call the collection a “CVR collection;” otherwise
we call it a “noCVR collection.”
4.4 Tabulation audits
Confidence in the reported contest outcome can be
derived from a tabulation audit.
The main point of a tabulation audit is to de-
termine whether errors affected a reported contest
outcome, making it different than the actual con-
test outcome.
Definition 6 The actual contest outcome for a
contest is the result of applying the outcome rule
to the actual tally for the cast paper votes for that
contest.
Such audits are called “tabulation audits,” as
they only check the interpretation and tallying of
the paper votes; they do not check other aspects,
such as evidence that the “chain of custody” of the
paper ballots was properly maintained and docu-
mented. (Harvie Branscomb suggested the term
“tabulation audit.”)
A “compliance audit” can provide assurance
that the paper trail has the necessary integrity.
For details, see Benaloh et al. [3], Lindeman and
Stark [26], and Stark and Wagner [50].
Alvarez et al. [1] provide a general introduction to
election audits. Bretschneider et al. [6] give an ex-
cellent overview of audits, particularly risk-limiting
audits.
4.5 Ballot-level versus precinct-level
tabulation audits
A tabulation audit attains efficiency by using sam-
pling and statistical methods.
In this note, we focus on ballot-level sampling,
resulting in ballot-level audits. The population
to be sampled from is a sequence of all relevant cast
paper votes. Each unit examined in the audit is a
single paper vote.
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There are auditing methods that sample at a
coarser level: the units randomly selected for au-
diting are larger batches of paper votes, such as all
the votes scanned by a given scanner, or all of the
paper votes from a given precinct. Precinct-level
sampling results in a precinct-level audit. See
Aslam et al. [2] for an approach to precinct-level
auditing.
Ballot-level auditing is much more efficient than
precinct-level auditing, as was first pointed out by
Andy Neff [31]. Also see Stark [49]. Roughly speak-
ing, for a given level of assurance, the number of
audit units that need to be sampled is rather inde-
pendent of their size(!). It is usually much easier
to sample and audit 200 ballots than to sample and
audit 200 precincts.
This efficiency advantage is the reason we restrict
attention to ballot-level auditing in this note.
4.6 Ballot-polling audits versus compar-
ison audits
Ballot-level statistical audits may differ as to
whether they make use of cast vote records (CVRs)
or not. This difference is quite significant—it has
dramatic effects on audit efficiency and audit com-
plexity.
If cast vote records are not available or are not
used in the audit, then auditing a paper vote only
involves looking at the ballot that has been ran-
domly selected for audit, and recording the choice
made by the voter on that ballot for the contest
under audit.
Such audits are called ballot-polling audits,
because of the perceived similarity between asking
voters how they voted afterwards (an “exit poll”)
and “asking” a ballot what is on it (a “ballot-
polling audit”).
By contrast with a ballot-polling audit, a com-
parison audit is based on comparing, for each pa-
per vote selected for audit, the choice recorded in
the CVR for that vote for the contest under au-
dit with the choice for that contest observed by an
auditor who examines the paper vote by hand.
Comparison audits are significantly more efficient
than ballot-polling audits, requiring the examina-
tion of many fewer paper votes.
Furthermore, comparison audits have the bene-
fit that they may reveal specific problems with how
the voting system interpreted votes. For example,
the system might have problems with marks made
a certain kind of ink, or with the marks in regions
where the ballot was folded for mailing. Such ben-
efits are real, even though they are a bit tangential
to our objective of auditing contest outcomes.
On the other hand, a comparison audit is more
complex. Most importantly, it requires a reliable
way of matching each paper vote with its corre-
sponding electronic CVR.
Typically, each CBR (cast ballot record) specifies
the physical location of its matching paper ballot
(the physical location being one of those specified
on the ballot manifest). A CVR (cast vote record)
in the CBR can then be matched with the corre-
sponding paper vote on the specified paper ballot.
Scanners may imprint IDs. Additionally,
some optical scanners print a unique ID on each
paper ballot when it is scanned; this ID is also
recorded in the CBR. Such an ID helps to confirm
that the correct paper ballot has been retrieved.
Ballot-level auditing protocol for compari-
son audits. Best practice for a comparison au-
dit should have the auditors merely recording the
actual choice observed on the audited paper vote
for the contest under audit, rather than doing the
comparison at the same time. Such a protocol elim-
inates the temptation for an auditor to “fudge” his
observation to match the CVR. The actual com-
parison of a choice recorded on the CVR with the
choice observed and recorded by the auditor may
be made later. (It is OK for the CVR choices to be
presented to the auditors immediately after they
have recorded their observed choices.)
4.7 Audits versus recounts
By definition, the actual outcome for a contest
may be obtained by doing a full manual recount
of the paper votes for that contest. This determines
the actual vote for each paper ballot for that con-
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test, allowing one to determine the actual tally
giving the number of votes for each possible choice
for that contest. Applying the outcome rule to the
actual tally gives the actual outcome.
In a recount every cast paper ballot is examined
by hand, determining the “voter’s intent” (actual
vote) for each contest under audit.
This is true in at least “voter intent states” where
the interpreted voter intent is authoritative. In
other states, auditors must determine not what the
voter intended, but what the machine interpreta-
tion should have been, even if it differs from the
clearly expressed voter intent.
As a recount examines every cast paper ballot, it
can be slow and expensive.
Its virtue is that it is guaranteed to return each
actual contest outcome (which is, by definition, the
result of a hand examination and tally of all cast
paper ballots).
(This statement is only true to the extent that
the audit process is identical to the recount process.
The recount process may have flaws and there may
even be legal challenges to particular ballot inter-
pretations and to the recount results.)
Recounts are generally the best way to confirm
a contest outcome for a close contest. Many states
mandate recounts for contests where the “margin
of victory” is small—say, under 0.5%. (Recall that
the margin of victory in a contest is the difference
between the vote share for the winner and the vote
share for the runner-up, measured as a fraction of
the number of votes cast.)
Compared to recounts, tabulation audits can be
remarkably efficient. By using random sampling
and statistical methods, an audit can support a
high degree of confidence in the reported contest
outcome after the manual examination of relatively
few paper votes. A state-wide contest in a large
state may require examining only a few dozen or
few hundred randomly chosen paper votes out of
millions cast.
Such efficiency may be a compelling reason to use
statistical tabulation audits.
However, such efficiency is critically dependent
on how close the contest is. When the margin of
victory is large—the election is landslide—a statis-
tical tabulation audit is marvelously efficient. But
when the margin of victory is small, a tabulation
audit can regress into a full recount—almost all the
cast paper votes need to be examined to determine
who really won. The best plan may be to do a
statistical audit for those contests that are not too
close, and to fully recount all contests that are close.
4.8 Statistical tabulation audits
This section describes the structure of a typical sta-
tistical tabulation audit, and the motivation (effi-
ciency) for such a structure.
The secret for achieving efficiency, compared to
doing a full hand recount, is to use statistics.
The main benefit of a statistical approach to a
tabulation audit is that the audit may require the
hand examination of only a small number of ran-
domly selected ballots, instead of the hand exami-
nation of all ballots, as a full recount would require.
There are some drawbacks to a statistical ap-
proach, however.
One drawback is that the auditor must be able to
draw ballots at random from the set of cast ballots.
While this is not so difficult, it does require some
preparation and organization.
A second drawback is that the assurance pro-
vided by a statistical audit is only statistical in na-
ture, and not absolute. This is unavoidable, as the
evidence provided by a small random sample can
never be definitive. A statistical audit always comes
with a caveat—its conclusions are always subject to
the possibility of error due to “bad luck” in the ran-
dom drawing of ballots. Fortunately, one may limit
the chance of having such “bad luck” to a desired
“risk-limit” by using sufficiently large samples.
A third drawback is that the best statistical pro-
cedures, in order to achieve maximum efficiency on
the average, use a sample size that may vary. The
audit will use a sequence of successively larger ran-
dom samples of ballots, until sufficient evidence is
obtained that the reported contest outcome is cor-
rect. If the contest was extremely close or the re-
ported outcome was wrong, the audit may examine
all cast ballots.
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A fourth drawback is that complex elections will
have complex audits, so software support may be
needed for the audit itself. Such software is itself
subject to programming errors and even to attack.
A final drawback is that not everyone under-
stands and appreciates statistical methods. Trust
in the audit outcome thus seems to require some
trust in the integrity and expertise of those running
the audit. However, the audit data should be pub-
lic, and each candidate may enlist its own experts
to confirm the audit methodology and conclusions.
We recap the desired audit structure of a statis-
tical audit.
Instead of doing a full recount, it is usually more
efficient to audit using a statistical method based
on manual examination of a random sample of
the paper votes, a method first proposed in 2004
by Johnson [20].
Such a statistical tabulation audit provides
statistical assurance that the reported contest out-
come is indeed equal to the actual contest outcome,
while examining by hand typically only a relatively
small number of the paper votes. In the presence
of errors or fraud sufficient to make the reported
contest outcome incorrect, the audit may exam-
ine many paper votes, or normally even all paper
votes, before concluding that the reported contest
outcome was incorrect.
Successively larger samples of cast paper votes
are drawn and examined by hand, until a stopping
rule says that either the examined sample provides
strong support for the reported contest outcome,
or that all cast paper votes have been examined for
the contest under audit.
The reason for having such a sequential structure
to the audit is to provide efficiency: the stopping
rule directs the audit to stop as early as it can, when
enough evidence has been collected in support of
the reported contest outcome.
However, if the contest is very close, or if the
reported outcome is incorrect, then structuring the
audit as a sequential decision-making process may
provide little benefit relative to performing a full
hand recount, as the audit may need to examine all
or nearly all of the paper votes.
The inputs to a statistical tabulation audit for a
contest are:
• A sequence of cast paper ballots, each pa-
per ballot containing a paper vote for the con-
test under audit.
• A ballot manifest describing the physical
storage location of each cast paper ballot.
• (Optional) A file giving a cast vote record
for each cast paper vote.
• A contest outcome determination rule
(outcome rule) that can determine the con-
test outcome for any cast vote tally.
• A reported contest outcome for the con-
test.
• A method for drawing ballots at random
from the sequence of cast paper ballots. This
method may require a random number seed
produced in a public ceremony.
• An initial sample size to use.
• A risk-measuring method that can, for a
given reported contest outcome and sample
tally, determine the risk associated with stop-
ping the audit without further sampling.
• A risk limit (a number between 0 and 1) de-
termining how much risk one is willing to ac-
cept that the audit accepts as correct a re-
ported contest outcome that is incorrect. A
smaller risk limit implies that the audit pro-
vides more certainty in the final accepted con-
test outcome.
• A stopping rule for determining whether the
current sample supports the reported contest
outcome with sufficient certainty (based on the
given risk limit), so that the audit may stop.
• An escalation method specifying how the
sample size should be increased if/when the
stopping rule says to continue the audit. It
might, for example, say to increase the size
of the sample by thirty percent whenever the
audit escalates. (It might also say to switch
over to a full recount of all the ballots, as this
may be more efficient than continuing to sam-
ple ballots at random.)
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Some audit methods may require additional inputs,
such as the reported vote tally or auxiliary tie-
breaking information.
Statistical tabulation audits have the structure
shown in Figure 1.
If the reported contest outcome is wrong, the au-
dit will be quite likely to discover this fact—the
stopping rule is unlikely to ever accept that the in-
correct reported contest outcome is correct—and
the audit procedure will proceed to examine all pa-
per votes.
It seems reasonable to require that if the audit is
going to overturn the reported contest outcome, it
should only do so with full certainty, after having
examined all relevant cast votes. If a partial audit
reveals that there is strong statistical evidence (but
not certainty) that the reported contest outcome is
wrong, one could conceivably stop the audit early,
but the candidate who was “de-throned” might in-
sist on a full manual recount (if he or she had the
legal basis for doing so). So we assume the follow-
ing.
Assumption 8 For an audit to overturn a re-
ported contest outcome requires manual examina-
tion of all relevant cast votes.
The stopping rule in a statistical tabulation au-
dit, as described here, is based entirely on some
measure of statistical confidence achieved that the
reported contest outcome is correct.
The stopping rule might also depend on the sam-
ple size, allowing a trade-off between audit work-
load and statistical confidence, or even a cap on
audit workload. If the audit stops early because
of workload considerations, the audit procedure
should nonetheless report what level of confidence
was obtained in the reported contest outcome. We
do not explore such trade-offs or workload caps
here.
4.9 Sampling
To derive statistical confidence in a reported contest
outcome, a statistical tabulation audit requires the
ability to “sample ballots at random.” This section
considers what this means.
Population to be sampled. The population
to be sampled is the sequence of cast paper votes
for this contest.
This population is best and most properly de-
fined by the ballot manifest that says where the
paper ballots are stored. The size of the population
should be equal to the number of ballot locations
indicated on the ballot manifest.
(This statement assumes that there is only a sin-
gle ballot manifest for the entire collection of cast
paper ballots.)
(This statement also assumes that the contest un-
der audit appears on every cast paper ballot. If this
is not true, then the ballot manifest or other trust-
worthy information should indicate the ballot styles
of ballots stored in various containers, so that the
number of location of ballots having a given contest
can be determined from the ballot manifest.)
We assume here that the ballot manifest is
correct—that all cast paper ballots are accounted
for and they are stored as indicated in the ballot
manifest. Assurance that the ballot manifest is cor-
rect may be provided by ballot accounting and a
compliance audit (see Stark et al. [50]).
Assumption 9 [Correct ballot manifest.] The
ballot manifest correctly describes the number of
cast ballots and the current locations of those bal-
lots.
If CVRs are available, one might alternatively
consider defining the population to be sampled from
these electronic cast vote records produced when
the ballots are scanned. This may be a tempt-
ing approach, but it is contrary to the purpose of
the audit, which is primarily to check the accuracy
of the results produced by the scanner. Using the
scanner-produced CBRs to define the population to
be sampled from may defeat this purpose. A ma-
licious scanner may produce a CBR list that does
not include all ballots, for example.
If CVRs are available, then a first step of the tab-
ulation audit should be to confirm that the number
of ballot locations on the ballot manifest is equal
to the number of CVRs available, and that no two
CVRs point to the same location listed on the ballot
manifest.
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1. [Draw initial sample of ballots] From the sequence of cast paper votes as defined by the
relevant ballot manifest(s), draw at random an initial sample of cast paper votes to be audited.
This begins the first stage of the audit.
2. [Examine ballots by hand] Examine by hand the (new) paper votes in the sample, following
any relevant voter-intent guidelines for interpretation, and record the results (the “actual votes”
for these ballots).
3. [Tally] If this is a ballot-level ballot-polling audit, tally the actual votes in the sample. Otherwise,
this is a ballot-level comparison audit: compare the votes seen on the newly examined paper votes
with their electronic CVRs, and tally the (reported vote, actual vote) pairs in the sample.
4. [Stop if all ballots now examined] If there are no more ballots to be audited, the audit has
completed a full manual recount. Report “All ballots examined.,” publish details of the audit
results, including the now-determined correct election outcome, and stop the audit.
5. [Risk-measurement] Compute the risk associated with stopping the audit without further sam-
pling. This computation depends on the sample tally, any auxiliary tie-breaking information, and
the reported contest outcome.
6. [Risk limit reached?] If the measured risk is no more than the given risk-limit, report “Reported
outcome accepted.,” publish details of the audit results, and stop the audit.
7. [Escalate: augment sample and begin new stage] Otherwise, draw additional ballots at ran-
dom and place them in the sample. The number of additional ballots to be sampled is determined
by the escalation method. This begins a new stage of the audit. Return to step 2.
Figure 1: Structure of a statistical tabulation audit.
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Random and pseudo-random numbers The
sampling process requires a source of random (or
pseudo-random) numbers. (Random or pseudoran-
dom numbers may also be needed for other pur-
poses, such for generating IDs to be imprinted on
ballots as they are scanned.)
To generate a single random number, one can
roll a number of decimal dice. Twenty or more
such dice suffice. (Six-sided dice could also be used,
with 26 or more rolls for equivalent entropy.) See
Figure 2.
If this single number is to be trusted by observers
as having been randomly generated, the dice-rolling
ceremony might be performed in a public video-
taped ceremony. See for example the videos [16,
15] of dice-rolling for the June 2016 San Francisco
election audit.
As an alternative method, one could use the
“NIST random beacon” [33], which produces
512 truly random bits (128 hexadecimal digits) ev-
ery minute from physical sources of randomness.
One could even combine the methods, using a
number of digits from decimal dice followed by a
number of digits from the NIST random beacon.
In practice (as with election audits) one often
needs many randomly generated numbers, not just
a single randomly generated number.
When more than one random number is needed,
it is reasonable to use a cryptographic pseudo-
random number generator. Such a generator
takes a truly random seed (a large random number
such as might be obtained by rolling 20 decimal
dice), and can then extend it to an arbitrarily-long
sequence of pseudo-random numbers.
For practical purposes, each newly generated
pseudo-random number is indistinguishable from
what might be produced by a fresh dice roll. Suc-
cessive pseudo-random numbers generated can then
be used to pick ballots to be sampled.
Pseudo-random number generation has been
well-studied, and excellent pseudo-random number
generators have been proposed and even standard-
ized by the U.S. government. (Because generat-
ing pseudo-random numbers is trickier than one
might first expect, using a standardized method is
strongly recommended.)
For the purposes of election audits, we recom-
mend using “SHA256 in counter mode” as a
pseudo-random number generator. SHA256 is a
U.S. national standard for cryptographic hash func-
tions [34]. Each output of SHA256 is a 256-bit (77
decimal digit) pseudo-random whole number.
Running SHA256 in counter mode means apply-
ing SHA256 to a sequence of consecutive whole
numbers starting with the given seed, and using
the sequence of corresponding output numbers so
generated. The given seed should be generated in
a truly random manner, such as by rolling dice. In
this proposal, the SHA256 input is created by tak-
ing the seed, following it by a comma and then the
decimal representation of the counter value.
For example, with input
“107432020578817523419453,1”
we obtain SHA256 output (in decimal)
097411546950308080061616750587378383961
909559564631478751824138412344194481105
whereas with input
“107432020578817523419453,2”
we obtain SHA256 output:
031176744492396048120565507363585400255
289825756640350739975511058891174407379.
Increasing the counter value by one produces an
output that is for all practical purposes a random
integer freshly generated from new coin flips.
The random ballot-selection software provided by
Stark [57] or by Rivest [41] uses SHA256 in this
manner.
(Alternative NIST standards for random bit gen-
eration [35] could be used instead of SHA256; we
find SHA256 simple and convenient.)
Using a pseudo-random number generator whose
seed (initial counter value) is from a truly random
source has the advantages of both unpredictabil-
ity and reproducibility.
For unpredictability, it is important that the ran-
dom seed be determined after all initial election
data is published, so an adversary hoping to hide
manipulations from an auditor will not know which
election data will be audited when he does his ma-
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Figure 2: A roll of 24 decimal dice, yielding the seed 107432020578817523419453.
nipulations.
For reproducibility, the fact that the pseudo-
random number generator is deterministic (given
the seed and counter value) allows others to repro-
duce the computation and verify that the audit was
performed correctly.
Selecting a ballot at random A statistical tab-
ulation audit selects paper votes at random for au-
diting.
Each such paper vote is selected uniformly at ran-
dom from the population of paper votes for the con-
test under audit. This presumes that we have a list
(typically the ballot manifest) specifying the loca-
tion of every ballot (and thus every paper vote) in
the population.
Sampling may be done with replacement or
without replacement. Sampling with replace-
ment means that a given sampled ballot is replaced
in the population being sampled, implying that a
ballot may be sampled more than once. Sampling
without replacement means that each paper vote
appears at most once in the sample.
For election audits, we assume that sampling
is done without replacement—once a paper
vote has been picked, it can not be picked again.
Here are two approaches for implementing the
sampling:
• A paper vote may be chosen at random by
generating a fresh random (or pseudo-random)
number, and then taking the remainder of that
number when divided by the number of cast
ballots. This remainder (after adding 1) can
be used as an index into the ballot manifest
to identify the chosen ballot containing the de-
sired paper vote. This approach provides sam-
pling with replacement. If sampling without
replacement is desired instead, one may repeat-
edly pick a random ballot location in this way
until one finds a previously unpicked ballot lo-
cation.
• Another way to organize sampling without re-
placement is to associate each ballot (location)
with a freshly-generated pseudo-random num-
ber. Then the ballots can be sampled in order
of increasing associated pseudo-random num-
bers.
One purpose of an audit is to detect adversarial
manipulation of a contest outcome. For this rea-
son it is important that any random numbers used
in the audit (either random numbers directly, or
the seed(s) for pseudo-random number generation)
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should be generated after the reported contest out-
come and the cast vote records for that contest have
been published. An adversary should have no abil-
ity to predict what paper votes will be selected for
the audit. If he could, then might be able to effect
changes in the CVRs of paper votes that will not
be audited.
It is sometimes suggested that at least some pa-
per votes should be selected for auditing in an ar-
bitrary or non-random manner. For example, one
might allow losing candidates to select some of the
paper votes to be audited, based on whatever side
information or suspicions they may have. There
is nothing wrong in doing so, and it may help al-
lay suspicions of a losing candidate that the elec-
tion was stolen somehow. However, paper votes
selected in such a manner can not be included in
the random sample to be used in a statistical tabu-
lation audit, precisely because they were selected in
a non-random manner. Any ballots selected in such
a non-random manner are not part of the statistical
tabulation audit unless they are coincidentally also
picked by the audit’s random sampling method.
4.10 Initial sample size
The initial sample size should be big enough to pro-
vide some evidence in favor of the real winner with-
out suffering unduly from the statistical variations
of small samples.
For a ballot-polling audit, the initial sample size
should be large enough so that the top candidates
each have a good handful of ballots in the sample.
Having an initial sample size of ten times the
number of candidates seems like a reasonable
choice. That is, for a yes/no contest, use an initial
sample size of at least 20 votes, and for a contest
with five candidates, use an initial sample size of 50
votes.
For a comparison audit, where discrepancies be-
tween reported and actual ballot types are impor-
tant, the initial sample size should be large enough
so that one expects to see a handful of discrepan-
cies.
One may also wish to make the initial sample size
at least as large as the “initial prior size” (sum of
initial prior pseudocounts—see Section B.3). The
above heuristic rules may typically achieve this ob-
jective in any case.
Further experimentation and research here could
help to refine these heuristic guidelines.
4.11 Examining a selected paper vote
When a paper vote is selected for auditing, how
should it be examined?
Since an audit is in the limit (as the sample size
approaches and equals the total number of cast
votes) supposed to yield the actual contest outcome
(as would be determined by a full manual recount
of that contest), the process of auditing a pa-
per vote should be identical to that used in
a manual recount.
Many states have rules for manual recounts;
fewer have explicit rules for audits.
States that are “voter intent states” mandate
that the correct interpretation of ballot is the one
that best captures “voter intent.” Colorado is a
voter intent state, and provides a manual describ-
ing how to interpret voter intent [37].
Some states require that manual recounts be per-
formed by four-person teams, with two people (one
from each party) examining each paper vote and
reading the choice out loud, and two people (one
from each party) recording the choice read onto pre-
pared data recording sheets.
If the ballot has no associated CBR, then the au-
ditors just record the observed choice on the ballot
for the contest being audited (this is the “actual
vote” on that ballot for the audited contest).
On the other hand, if the ballot does have an as-
sociated CBR, at what point does the CVR data
(indicating the choice read by the scanner for that
ballot for the contest under audit) get compared
with the choice observed by the auditor on the pa-
per vote?
I think it a mistake for the auditors to know the
corresponding CVR data at the time they observe
the selected paper vote. Auditors would be too
tempted to “fudge” their observations to agree with
the scanner results. It is better for the auditors to
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record the choice they observe on the audited paper
vote without knowing the CVR data at all. The au-
ditors’ observations can be transmitted to “Audit
Central,” where others can make the comparison
to see if there is a discrepancy. Or, the compari-
son can be done locally, as long as it is done after
the initial audit interpretation has been made and
securely recorded.
Luther Weeks2 suggests that the auditor should
submit a photo (digital image) of each paper ballot
audited together with the interpretation of that bal-
lot, thereby facilitating public review and discour-
aging biased interpretations. This procedure might
improve transparency and have some positive effect
on public confidence in election outcomes.
4.12 Risk-limiting audits
Stark [51] has provided a refined notion of a sta-
tistical tabulation audit—that of a risk-limiting
tabulation audit (or RLA or RLTA).
Definition 7 A (frequentist) risk-limiting tabu-
lation audit is a statistical tabulation audit such
that if the reported contest outcome is incorrect, the
audit has at most a pre-specified chance of failing to
examine all cast ballots and thereby correcting the
reported outcome.
If the reported contest outcome is incorrect, the
audit may nonetheless accept the reported contest
outcome as correct with probability at most equal
to the prespecified risk limit. The risk limit might
be, say, 0.05 (five percent).
Lindeman and Stark have provided a “gentle
introduction” to RLAs [26]. General overviews
of election audits are available from Lindeman et
al. [25], Norden et al. [32], and the Risk-Limiting
Audit Working Group [6]. Stark and Wagner [50]
promulgate the notion of an “evidence-based elec-
tion,” which includes not only a risk-limiting tab-
ulation audit but also the larger goals of ensuring
that the evidence trail has integrity.
A variety of statistical methods for providing
RLAs have been developed [52, 18, 53, 54, 55, 49,
56, 7, 36, 27, 48, 58, 43]. We also note the avail-
ability of online tools for risk-limiting audits [57].
2Private communication.
Since this note focuses on Bayesian tabulation
audits and not frequentist risk-limiting tabulation
audits, we omit further discussion of the details
of frequentist risk-limiting tabulation audits. Fre-
quentist risk-limiting tabulation audits are a pow-
erful tool in the auditor’s toolbox. Bayesian tabu-
lation audits are another.
5 Measuring risk–frequentist and
Bayesian measures
There is more than one way to measure the “risk”
associated with stopping early at the end of a given
stage.
These methods are generally one of two sorts:
“frequentist” methods and “Bayesian” methods.
The RLAs mentioned at the end of the previous
section are all “frequentist” methods. The methods
of this paper, and of the earlier paper by Rivest and
Shen [44] are “Bayesian” methods.
For this reason, I suggest calling the methods
of the previous section “frequentist risk-limiting
audits” (FRLAs), and the methods of this paper
“Bayesian risk-limiting vote tabulation audits (BR-
LAs).
(Or, one could insert “tabulation” to make the
acronyms longer: FRLTAs and BRLTAs.)
One could then use the term “risk-limiting au-
dit” (RLA) to refer to union of both types: RLA =
FRLA + BRLA, with the understanding that the
notion of “risk” is different for these two types of
audits.
What’s the difference between a frequentist and
a Bayesian audit?
The distinction reflects a long-standing and
somewhat controversial division in the foundations
of probability and statistics between Bayesians and
frequentists (non-Bayesians).
It is difficult to do justice to this issue in this
short note. I refer to Murphy’s text [30] for a
modern discussion of this issue from a machine-
learning (and pro-Bayesian) point of view. For a
short amusing treatment, see Munroe [28]. Orloff
and Bloom [39] provide a concise set of relevant
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course notes.
Both approaches have value and are widely used.
While some may argue that one approach is “right”
and the other is “wrong,” I prefer a more pragmatic
attitude: both approaches provide useful perspec-
tives and tools.
Bayesian approaches have a flexibility that is dif-
ficult or awkward to match with frequentist ap-
proaches; as we shall see, they are easily adapted
to handle multi-jurisdictional contests, or contests
with preferential voting.
A Bayesian approach seems closer to the
way a typical person thinks about probability—
associating probabilities directly with propositions,
rather than the frequentist style of associating prob-
abilities with the outcomes of well-defined experi-
ments.
For a Bayesian, a probability may be identified
with a “subjective probability” or “degree of belief”
(in a proposition). A Bayesian may be comfort-
able talking about “the probability that a reported
election outcome is different than what a full hand-
count would reveal (having seen only a sample of
the cast votes)”, while such a statement makes no
sense to a frequentist (since the cast votes have a
fixed outcome).
The Bayesian is fine with a game of “guess which
hand is holding the pawn?”; he ascribes a probabil-
ity of 1/2 to each possibility, representing his igno-
rance of the truth. For the frequentist, it doesn’t
make sense to talk about the probability of the
pawn being in one hand or the other without pos-
tulating a sequence of trials of some sort. But there
is only one trial here.
A Bayesian updates probabilities associated to
various possibilities on the basis of evidence ob-
served.
Nuts-in-cans example We give a simple exam-
ple that illustrates Bayesian thinking.
Suppose there is a row of three tin cans, each of
which may be empty or contain a nut.
You are told that the cans are not all empty and
do not all contain nuts, so there are six possibilities.
See Figure 3. You don’t know anything more about
Figure 3: Nuts in cans. A filled circle represents
a can with a nut; an empty circle represents a can
without a nut. Each of the six rows represents one
possibility, which you deem equally likely. After
you shake the first can, and hear a nut, the only
remaining possibilities are given in the first three
rows, which you now deem to have probability one-
third each of representing reality. You estimate the
chance that a majority of cans contain nuts as two-
thirds (rows two and three).
the cans or their contents.
Initially, then, you might believe that of the six
possibilities are equally likely. These are your prior
(or initial) probabilities With these prior prob-
abilities there is an equal chance that a majority of
the cans are empty and that a majority of the cans
contain a nut.
You are then allowed to pick up one can and
shake it. You pick up the leftmost can, shake it,
and discover that it contains a nut.
What is the probability now that a majority of
the cans contain a nut?
(Again, to a frequentist this question makes no
sense, since either the cans have a majority of nuts
or they don’t.)
To you, there are only three possible arrange-
ments remaining. See the first three rows of Fig-
ure 3. Each of those three arrangements seems
equally likely to you now (and this is what “Bayes
Rule” implies here).
Furthermore, two of those three possibilities have
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more nuts than not.
Thus, you (as a Bayesian) now believe that there
is a two-thirds chance that there are more nuts than
not.
Extensions to audits The extension of this
“nuts-in-cans” example to auditing elections may
now seem to be somewhat intuitive, at least for a
ballot-polling audit. Shaking a can corresponds to
examining a ballot in the audit. You (as a Bayesian)
auditor have a subjective probability that “the nuts
will win” as you sample more and more ballots.
The audit continues until you are quite sure that
the nuts won. After examining one can, there is a
Bayesian risk of 1/3 that the no-nuts cans are in
the majority.
6 Bayesian tabulation audits
Rivest and Shen [44] define and promulgate the no-
tion of a “Bayesian (tabulation) audit,” and
suggest a way of implementing a Bayesian tabu-
lation audit.
As we shall see, Bayesian audits provide increased
flexibility (compared to risk-limiting tabulation au-
dits) at the cost of an increased amount of compu-
tation for the stopping rule. Since computation is
now cheap, this computational requirement is not
a practical concern or constraint.
This section provides an exposition of the basic
Bayesian audit method of Rivest and Shen [44]; see
that work for further discussion and details.
The Bayesian audit is a statistical tabulation au-
dit that provides assurance that the reported con-
test outcome is correct, or else finds out the correct
contest outcome.
Bayesian methods have recently proven very ef-
fective in the context of machine learning, often
replacing earlier non-Bayesian methods (see Mur-
phy [30]); the proposals here follow a similar theme,
but for tabulation audits.
Our initial presentation is for ballot-polling au-
dits only (with no CVRs); Section 6.13 then shows
how the method of Bayesian tabulation audits can
be extended to handle comparison audits.
Our presentation examples are for plurality elec-
tions for familiarity and clarity, but Bayesian audits
work for any outcome rule.
6.1 Bayesian measurement of outcome
probabilities
At each stage in a Bayesian audit, the auditor com-
putes the probability that each possible contest out-
come is the actual contest outcome.
This computation is based on the current sample
tally, as well other inputs such as the Bayesian prior
and auxiliary tie-breaking information.
More precisely: at any stage, the Bayesian audi-
tor can provide a numeric answer to the question,
“What is the probability of obtaining a particular
actual election outcome if I were to audit all of the
cast paper votes?” For a race between a set of
candidates, the Bayesian auditor knows each can-
didate’s “probability of winning the contest, should
all of the paper ballots be audited.”
This sort of question makes no sense from a “fre-
quentist” point of view, but is a natural one from a
Bayesian perspective.
If all of the cast paper votes were to be examined,
the actual contest outcome would be revealed, and
one of the following two events would occur:
• We would discover that the reported out-
come is correct (that is, the reported con-
test outcome is the same as the actual contest
outcome), or
• We would discover that the reported out-
come is wrong (that is, the reported contest
outcome is different than the actual contest
outcome). Rivest and Shen [44] call the event
that the reported contest outcome is wrong an
“upset”; we won’t use that terminology here
since it might be confused with the notion that
the actual contest winner is an “underdog.”
The Bayesian auditor answers the question,
“What is the probability that the re-
ported outcome is correct?”
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(or the opposite question, “What is the probability
that the reported outcome is wrong?”).
6.2 Bayesian risk
An election audit having the structure of a sequen-
tial decision-making procedure, as shown in Fig-
ure 1, may stop the audit early when it shouldn’t.
This is an error.
Since the audit only stops early when the audit
judges that the reported outcome is quite likely to
be correct, the audit only makes an error of this sort
when the reported outcome is wrong but the audit
judges that the reported outcome is quite likely to
be correct.
Traditionally, a Bayesian inference procedure in-
curs some sort of penalty or loss when it makes
such an error. For example, it might incur a “loss
of 1” when it makes an error, and no loss otherwise.
While one may imagine more complicated loss func-
tions, we’ll use this simple loss function.
The risk associated with a Bayesian decision-
making procedure is just the expected loss, where
the expectation is taken with respect to the
(Bayesian) estimation of the associated probabili-
ties.
With this simple loss function (loss of 1 for an er-
ror, loss of 0 otherwise), the Bayesian risk is just
the expected probability that the reported
outcome is wrong, measured at the time the
audit stops.
6.3 Bayesian risk limit
One input to a Bayesian audit is the “Bayesian
risk limit”: a desired upper bound on the prob-
ability that the audit will make an error (by ac-
cepting an incorrect reported contest outcome as
correct).
We note that an audit will not make the
other sort of error—rejecting a correct reported
outcome—because of our assumption that an au-
dit must proceed to examine all cast votes before
rejecting a reported contest outcome. Once all cast
votes have been examined by the audit, the correct
contest outcome is revealed (by definition).
To distinguish the notion of a risk limit as used
here from the notion of a risk limit as used in a
“(frequentist) risk-limiting audit” we call the risk
limit used here a “Bayesian risk limit.”
It would be natural to call the risk limit used in
a (frequentist) risk-limiting audit a “frequentist
risk limit”, although common usage is to merely
call it a “risk limit,” which has the potential for
causing some confusion.
A typical choice for the Bayesian risk limit might
be 0.05—a “five percent” Bayesian risk limit.
6.4 Bayesian audit stopping rule
The Bayesian audit stops when the computed prob-
ability that the reported contest outcome is wrong
becomes less than the given Bayesian risk limit.
With a Bayesian risk limit of five percent, the
Bayesian audit stops when the computed probabil-
ity that the reported contest outcome is wrong is
found to be less than five percent.
The stopping rule for a Bayesian audit takes the
form,
Stop the audit if the probability
that the reported contest outcome is
wrong is less than the given Bayesian
risk limit.
A Bayesian audit, like any statistical tabulation
audit, makes a trade-off between assurance and
efficiency. Lowering the Bayesian risk limit pro-
vides increased assurance, but at increased cost. A
Bayesian risk limit of 0.05 (five percent) is likely to
be a reasonable choice.
Putting it another way: with a Bayesian risk
limit of five percent, the Bayesian audit stops when
the auditor is at least ninety-five percent certain
that the reported contest outcome is correct (or
when all cast ballots have been examined).
We might coin a term, and call the proba-
bility that the reported outcome is correct the
“assurance level.” (This is not standard termi-
nology.)
We might correspondingly call call one minus the
risk limit the “assurance requirement.” A risk
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limit of five percent corresponds to an assurance
requirement of ninety-five percent.
Then the stopping rule for a Bayesian audit takes
the form:
Stop the audit if the probability that
the reported contest outcome is cor-
rect (that is, the assurance level) is
at least the given assurance require-
ment.
This says nothing new; it just restates the stop-
ping rule in a more positive form.
Computing the “probability that the reported
contest outcome is wrong” (or correct) is done in a
Bayesian manner, as the following subsections now
describe.
6.5 Sample and nonsample
The auditor, having seen only the sample of selected
paper votes, does not know the actual sequence of
cast paper votes; he is uncertain.
From the auditor’s point of view, the actual cast
(paper) vote sequence consists of two parts:
• the part he has already seen: the sample of
cast votes that has been audited so far, and
• the part he has not yet seen: the (to coin a
term) nonsample of cast votes that have not
(yet) been audited.
The sample and the nonsample are complemen-
tary: they are disjoint but collectively include the
entire cast vote sequence. When a cast paper vote
is audited, it moves from the nonsample into the
sample.
The auditor knows exactly how many (actual)
votes for each possible choice there are in the sam-
ple; he has certainty about the tally for the sample.
What he does not know is how many votes there
are for each possible choice in the nonsample; he
has uncertainty about the tally of the nonsample.
6.6 Nonsample model and test nonsam-
ples
The auditor uses the sample to define a model for
the nonsample tally. More precisely, it is a model
for what the nonsample tally could be.
The model allows the auditor to generate and
consider many candidate nonsample tallies; these
are likely or plausible candidates for what the non-
sample tally really is, with some variations in the
frequency of each possible choice.
We use the term “test nonsample tallies” in-
stead of “candidate nonsample tallies” because we
are already using the word “candidate” to mean
something else.
Because of the way in which the nonsample model
is based on the sample, the fraction of votes for any
choice in a test nonsample tally will be approxi-
mately the same as the fraction of votes for that
choice in the actual sample tally. This is what we
want.
The true nonsample tally is unknown to the au-
ditor; the auditor is uncertain about the nonsample
tally. This uncertainty is captured by the fact that
the auditor can generate many different test non-
sample tallies, with vote choice frequencies having
an appropriate amount of variation between various
test nonsample tallies.
Adding the actual sample tally to a test nonsam-
ple tally gives the auditor a test vote tally; this
test vote tally is representative of a possible tally
for the entire cast vote sequence.
The auditor can apply the outcome rule to each
generated test vote tally, and measure how often
the contest outcome for such test tallies differs from
the reported contest outcome. (We assume that the
auditor can correctly apply the outcome rule, using
if necessary a reference implementation or publicly-
vetted open source software implementation.)
The Bayesian audit stops if the fraction of test
vote tallies yielding the reported contest outcome
exceed the desired assurance requirement (one mi-
nus the Bayesian risk limit).
Otherwise the Bayesian audit increases the sam-
ple size (audits more votes) and repeats.
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We now give more detail on these steps.
6.7 Simulation
After a sample of paper votes have been drawn, in-
terpreted by hand, recorded, and totaled, the audi-
tor knows the tally of votes in the sample. The tally
indicates how many votes there are in the sample
for each possible choice.
The auditor wishes to know whether he can now
stop the audit. He needs to answer the question:
“Is the probability that the reported contest out-
come is wrong less than the Bayesian risk limit?”
(And here the notion of “the probability that the
reported contest outcome is wrong” is interpreted
in a Bayesian manner—see Appendix for details.)
Since we there appears to be no slick mathemat-
ical formula giving the answer (even for a simple
plurality contest), we use a simulation-based ap-
proach, which always works.
We now describe the stopping rule for a Bayesian
tabulation audit. This description is for a ballot-
polling audit; Section 6.13 describes the modifica-
tions needed for comparison audits.
Figure 5 describes the Bayesian audit stopping
rule using this method.
Although the suggested number of iterations is
large (1,000,000), computers are fast, and this
whole computation may take just a few seconds.
We emphasize that the above procedure is en-
tirely computational. The current sample tally is
included in every test vote tally—test vote tallies
vary only in the composition of their nonsample
tally portion. No new paper votes are audited dur-
ing this computation, so it can be completed as
quickly as the computer can finish the computa-
tion.
The Bayesian tabulation audit has a “doubly-
nested loop” structure:
• The outer loop runs the generic procedure for
performing a statistical tabulation audit, as de-
scribed in Section 4.8. Sampling and examin-
ing actual paper votes happens in this outer
loop.
• The inner loop runs the Bayesian stopping rule,
as described above.
The Bayesian stopping rule is “simulation-based”
since it is implemented by simulating and examin-
ing many possible test vote tallies.
These test vote tallies are generated according to
a Bayesian posterior probability distribution of a
well-known form (a “Dirichlet-multinomial” distri-
bution; see Appendix B. Using these test vote tal-
lies, the auditor measures the fraction of test vote
tallies yielding a contest outcome different than the
reported contest outcome.
This measurement gives a correct result for the
Bayesian posterior probability that the reported
contest election outcome is wrong, up to the preci-
sion provided by the number of trials. The number
of trials suggested here (1,000,000) should give an
accuracy of this estimate of approximately 0.001,
which should be fine for our needs.
6.8 Generating a test nonsample tally
How can the auditor generate a test nonsample tally
whose statistics are “similar” to those of the current
sample tally?
Here is a simple procedure:
• Begin with the known current sample tally,
which gives the count of votes for each possible
choice in the current sample.
• “Fuzz” each count a bit (details to be de-
scribed).
• Determine the fraction of the total fuzzed
count associated with each choice; this be-
comes the “multinomial probability” associ-
ated with that choice.
• Draw a number of (simulated) ballots to make
up the (simulated) nonsample. The number of
ballots drawn is equal to the desired (known)
test nonsample size. Each (simulated) ballot
drawn has an associated choice; the choice is
selected randomly with probability equal to its
multinomial probability.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
test
fuzzed test test test
sample sample multinomial nonsample vote
test tally tally probabilities tally tally test
index A B A B A B A B A B winner
1 23 31 26.0 25.2 0.508 0.492 95 105 118 136 B
2 23 31 30.7 26.1 0.540 0.460 112 88 135 119 A
3 23 31 20.3 33.5 0.377 0.623 77 123 100 154 B
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
999998 23 31 14.0 30.3 0.316 0.684 47 153 70 184 B
999999 23 31 16.1 27.8 0.367 0.633 84 116 107 147 B
1000000 23 31 22.1 22.8 0.492 0.508 109 91 132 122 A
Figure 4: An example of the stopping rule determination for a Bayesian tabulation audit for a plurality
contest between candidates A and B with 254 cast votes and reported contest winner B. A sample of 54
ballots is examined by hand, showing 23 votes for A and 31 votes for B (the “sample tally”). One million test
variants are considered. In each variant, the (same) sample tally (b) is “fuzzed,” yielding the “test fuzzed
sample tally” (c). The test fuzzed sample tally is used to derive “test multinomial probabilities” (d).
Then these test multinomial probabilities are used to derive a “test nonsample tally” (e) summing to 200
votes (the number of votes not in the sample). The sum of the sample tally (b) and the test nonsample tally
(e) yields the test vote tally (f) from which the test winner (g) can be determined as the candidate with
the larger count in the test vote tally. Of the 1,000,000 test cases, A wins 114,783 times, or 11.48%. This is
more than an assumed Bayesian risk limit of five percent, so the audit continues. This computation takes
at most a few seconds on a typical desktop or laptop.
For example, suppose we have a plurality contest
with 254 cast votes between candidates A and B,
where B is the reported contest winner.
We emphasize at the outset that while this ex-
ample is for a plurality contest, everything carries
over in a straightforward way if the contest were
instead, say, an IRV contest based on preferential
voting.
Suppose the current sample has 54 cast paper
votes and has the following current sample tally
(counts of ballots of each type):
A : 23 B : 31 (1)
Then a fuzzed version of this tally might be:
A : 26.0 B : 25.2 . (2)
(See the first row in Table 4.) Note that the counts
in this fuzzed current sample tally are not necessar-
ily whole numbers, and that they do not necessarily
have the same sum as the original counts; that is
OK.
We then derive test multinomial probabilities.
The test monomial probability for A is the fraction
of fuzzed current sample tally for A; in the first row
of the table this is 26.0 / (26.0 + 25.2) = 0.508.
To generate the test nonsample tally we start
with the (known) nonsample size, which is 200 in
this example.
We then simulate the drawing of 200 ballots,
where each ballot has a 50.8% chance of being a
vote for A and a 49.2% chance of being a vote for
B. We tally the resulting 200 (simulated) ballots to
obtain the test nonsample tally.
In our example, we obtained the following test
nonsample tally:
A : 95 B : 105 . (3)
6.9 Test vote tallies
Adding together the current sample tally (1) and
the test nonsample tally (3) gives us the test vote
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1. Input: the number of cast votes, the current sample of cast votes, the tally of the current sample of
cast votes, the outcome rule (including any necessary tie-breaking information), and the Bayesian
risk limit.
2. Do the following a large number of times (e.g., 1,000,000 times) on a computer:
(a) Generate a “test nonsample tally” using a nonsample model based on the sample tallies.
(b) Add the test nonsample tally to the current sample tally to obtain a “test vote tally.”
(c) Apply the outcome rule to the test vote tally to determine the contest outcome for the test
vote tally.
3. Determine the fraction of test vote tallies for which the computed contest outcome is different
than the reported contest outcome.
4. If that fraction is less than the Bayesian risk limit, stop the audit.
Figure 5: Bayesian audit stopping rule.
tally for this example:
A : 118 B : 136 (4)
Clearly B is the winner for this test vote tally.
This process is repeated many times (say
1,000,000). Figure 4 gives an example of the stop-
ping rule determination.
6.10 Fuzzing one count
Now, how does one “fuzz” an individual count (a
tally element)?
The details are a bit technical, but the technical
details do not matter much.
Roughly speaking, the count is replaced by a ran-
domly chosen “fuzzed value” such that
• The fuzzed value is nonnegative.
• The fuzzed value is centered around the origi-
nal count (has an expected value equal to the
original count).
• The (absolute value of the) difference between
the fuzzed value and the original count is likely
to be at most a small multiple of the square
root of the original count.
• The fuzzing operation is additive, in the sense
that you could get a correctly fuzzed version of
16 by adding a fuzzed version of 5 to a fuzzed
version of 11.
The additivity property has the interesting con-
sequence that you can get a fuzzed value for any
count (say 16) by adding together that many fuzzed
versions of count 1.
Additivity means that you can also view the op-
eration of obtaining a fuzzed sample tally as:
• Giving each vote in the sample an initial
weight of one.
• Assigning each vote in the sample a “fuzzed
weight” equal to a fuzzed version of the value
one.
• Computing the fuzzed sample tally as the
weighted tally for the sample, where each vote
is now counted using its fuzzed weight.
See Figure 6
Appendix B gives details and discusses a pre-
cise version of the Bayesian audit proposal, where a
count is replaced by a random variable distributed
according to a gamma distribution with expected
value equal to the count, or, equivalently, by giv-
ing each individual vote a weight equal to that of
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A A B A B Fuzzed sample
A A B A B Sample
Figure 6: An illustration of vote-level fuzzing. The upper portion shows a sample of five votes, with A
receiving three votes and B receiving two votes. The lower portion shows the same sample, but with the
weight of each vote now “fuzzed.” While the initial weights were (1, 1, 1, 1, 1), the fuzzed weights, drawn
from an exponential distribution, are (0.583, 0.311, 2.439, 0.554, 1.640). In the re-weighted sample, B beats
A by 4.079 votes to 1.448 votes. This fuzzed tally is used to determine the multinomial probabilities for
this test instance. If we look at this example as fuzzing counts rather than fuzzing individual vote weights,
the initial count of 3 votes for A is fuzzed to 1.448 votes, and the initial count of 2 votes for B is fuzzed
to 4.079. Count-level fuzzing can be obtained using gamma distributions, which are equivalent to a sum of
exponential distributions.
a random variable drawn according to an exponen-
tial distribution with expected value one. See Fig-
ure 6.10 for a depiction of the exponential distribu-
tion, and Figure 6.10 for a depiction of the Gamma
distribution. Fuzzing counts in this way gives the
set of fractions of votes for each choice a Dirichlet
distribution. These fractions are used as multino-
mial probabilities to generate the test nonsample
tallies.
Variations are also described in Appendix B.
6.11 Other voting rules
We can now see how the Bayesian audit method
applies to any outcome rule.
The main thing to observe is that the outcome
rule is applied to each test vote tally to obtain each
test instance outcome. The outcome rule might
be for an exotic preferential voting method like
Schulze’s method, or might be for something as sim-
ple as approval voting. All that is needed is that
the rule be able to derive a contest outcome from a
tally of the number of votes for each possible choice.
(For preferential voting, recall that a vote is a list
of candidates in order of preference.)
6.12 Generative models and partitioned
(stratified) vote sequences
We emphasize that we are using the Bayesian ap-
proach to provide a generative model that allows
the auditor to generate many test vote tallies that
are similar to the unknown actual vote tally.
Mathematically, one may say that we are “sam-
pling from the Bayesian posterior distribution” in
the space of vote tallies. The test vote tallies gener-
ated are representative of the probability distribu-
tion inferred from the known sample of cast votes.
The above observation is central to the handling
of both comparison audits and multi-jurisdiction
audits.
The following example may be helpful in under-
standing how this observation gets used for those
applications.
Suppose the entire cast vote sequence has been
divided arbitrarily into two parts: cast vote se-
quence part one and cast vote sequence part two.
Suppose further that we have independently sam-
pled from both parts, yielding sample part one and
sample part two. (The fraction of votes from each
29
Figure 7: The exponential distribution. Fuzzing the weight of a single vote is done with the exponential
distribution. This plot shows the exponential distribution with expected value 1. A random variable with
an exponential distribution may take on any nonnegative real value. The probability of choosing a large
value decreases exponentially with that value.
part that are in the corresponding samples need not
be the same.)
We assume that there are no CVRs.
We wish to estimate the probability that a par-
ticular candidate would win the contest if all cast
paper votes were examined by hand.
Using methods described earlier, we can generate
many test vote tallies for the cast vote sequence
part one based on sample part one, and we can
generate many test vote tallies for the cast vote
sequence part two based on sample part two, since
we have a generative model for each part.
We can now easily generate a test vote tally for
the contest as a whole:
• Generate a test vote tally for cast vote se-
quence part one.
• Independently generate a test vote tally for
cast vote sequence part two.
• Add these two test vote tallies for the two parts
to obain a test vote tally for the entire contest.
(That is, the test vote tally for the entire con-
test is just the candidate-wise sum of the two
test vote tallies for the parts.)
We can in this way generate as many test vote
tallies for the entire contest as we like. We can
use these test vote tallies to measure “how often
a particular candidate wins the contest” just as we
did before. We get the answer we seek, even though
the cast vote sequence has been broken into parts.
We just need to have a generative model for the
tallies from each part, and add the test vote tallies
from each part to make an overall test vote tally.
This method works because the two parts are
independent—the sampling performed in one part
is independent of the sampling in the other part.
This approach generalizes in a straightforward
way to handle cast vote sequences that have been
divided into more than two parts. Such a general-
ization is useful when a contest is split over multiple
jurisdictions, as we shall see.
To be consistent with standard statistics termi-
nology, we may call each “part” a stratum, and
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Figure 8: The Gamma distribution. Fuzzing a given count is done with a gamma distribution with expected
value equal to the given count (and scale equal to 1). This plot shows gamma distributions with expected
values 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20. A gamma distribution with expected value 1 is the same as the exponential
distribution with expected value 1. A gamma distribution with a given expected value is just the sum of
that many independent random variables distributed with the exponential distribution, each having expected
value 1. As the expected value gets larger, the gamma distribution approaches a normal distribution with the
same expected value and variance equal to that expected value. The given count for the gamma distribution
may be any positive real number, it need not be a whole number.
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the overall approach a kind of stratified sampling
[69].
6.13 Bayesian comparison audits
This section describes how a Bayesian comparison
audit works. The previous portions of this sec-
tion described how a Bayesian ballot-polling audit
works.
It builds upon and uses the method described
above for a Bayesian ballot-polling audit, as ex-
tended by the method given in the last subsection
above on generative models and partitioned (strat-
ified) vote sequences. The same idea will be used
again when we deal with multi-jurisdiction elec-
tions.
When CVRs are available, each paper vote has
both a reported vote (the choice recorded in the
CVR) and an actual vote (the choice seen when
examining the paper vote by hand).
When a vote is audited in a comparison audit,
both the reported vote and the actual vote are avail-
able.
The key idea is to divide the cast vote se-
quence into parts, or strata, according to the
reported votes on the ballots.
For example, the votes with reported choice “Al-
ice” would form one part, while the votes with re-
ported choice “Bob” would form another.
As the audit proceeds, each part will have its own
sample, consisting of votes with the same reported
choice.
Combining the generated test vote tallies from
each part yields a generated test vote tally for the
contest as a whole. Once you can generate test vote
tallies for the contest as a whole, you can use the
Bayesian audit stopping rule to determine when the
audit should terminate.
That’s it.
With an accurate scanner, each part (stratum)
will consist almost entirely of votes whose actual
choice is equal to the reported choice for that
part. Exceptions correspond to scanning errors
or mis-interpretations. This uniformity, caused
by a high correlation between reported and actual
choices, is what gives comparison audits increased
efficiency. Roughly speaking, one is measuring error
rates (which are near zero) rather than vote shares
(which may be near one-half); measuring probabili-
ties near zero is easier than measuring probabilities
near one-half.
The generative model for a part will thus be a
generative model for votes having a given reported
choice.
The process of choosing Bayesian priors for com-
parison audits is discussed further in Appendix B.
Now we can make a generative model for the
entire cast vote sequence by combining generative
models for each part (i.e., for each reported vote
choice).
Each part will have its own sample and nonsam-
ple. The generative model will be used to generate
test vote tallies for the part, based on the votes in
the sample for that part. The test vote tally will
have an overall size (number of votes) equal to the
number of cast votes having votes with the given
reported choice.
Because of the strong (expected) correlation be-
tween reported votes and actual votes, we would ex-
pect that the generative models for each reported
vote would have little variance and be very reli-
able. It is only when votes with a given reported
choice have a variety of corresponding actual votes
that the generative model for that reported vote
will show much variability.
Combining the generative models for each re-
ported choice gives a generative model for the over-
all contest. The outcome rule can then be applied
to many different test votes tallies for the over-
all contest, in order to determine the probability
that the reported contest outcome is wrong. The
Bayesian audit stopping rule can then be used to de-
termine whether the audit should continue or not.
This completes the description of Bayesian com-
parison audits.
6.14 Workload estimation
As the Bayesian audit proceeds, it is possible to es-
timate how much work remains to be done (that is,
how many votes might yet need to be examined) in
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a simple manner. (Of course, this is just an esti-
mate, as the actual work to be performed depends
on what is found on the votes sampled.)
The method is simple.
Suppose the auditor has audited 400 votes, and
computed a probability of 7% that the reported
contest outcome is wrong. This 7% estimate is close
to his Bayesian risk limit of 5%.
It is easy for the auditor to estimate the probabil-
ity that the reported outcome is wrong for a sample
of 600 votes, for a “likely sample” of that size.
The procedure would first generate examples of
the likely extension of the sample (by 200 votes),
using Dirichlet parameters from the first 400 and
then using a multinomial distribution. (A Polya-
Eggenberger distribution might also be used.) Then
this hypothetical (larger) sample could be tested to
see if it provides sufficient assurance to finish the
audit. Running this operation a number of times
gives an estimate of the probability that sampling
another 200 ballots will allow completion of the au-
dit.
With this information, the auditor might com-
pute that the projected probability that the re-
ported outcome is wrong would almost certainly
decrease to 4%, so the audit will be over.
So, the auditor might schedule an escalation of
the audit by an additional 200 votes. Or, he could
estimate the chances that the audit would be over
for sample sizes other than 600.
Of course, he may be unlucky, and the newly au-
dited votes may cause the Bayesian audit to require
a total of more than 600 votes to complete. Such is
life in the world of statistics.
We note that the auditor can continually monitor
his projected workload as the sample size increases.
7 Multijurisdiction (stratified)
Bayesian audits
This section explains how one can extend the basic
Bayesian audit to handle contests covering multiple
jurisdictions.
Example scenario. For example, suppose that
each jurisdiction is a county within a state. While
many contests might be county-level, some con-
tests, such one for U.S. Congress, might span sev-
eral counties.
Suppose each county collects centrally all paper
ballots cast in any precinct in the county, and col-
lects together all vote-by-mail ballots sent in by res-
idents of that county. The county scans all such
ballots centrally (rather than at the precinct level).
In such a situation, we imagine that each county
maintains its own collection of paper ballots and
the associated ballot manifest for that collection.
Method. We now explain how to perform a
Bayesian audit in such a situation, for a contest
that spans several counties.
The overall structure of the Bayesian audit re-
mains unchanged—we audit until it is decided by a
stopping rule that the probability that the reported
contest outcome is wrong is less than Bayesian risk
limit.
The key idea for handling a contest spanning mul-
tiple jurisdictions is simple. Here is the stopping
rule to use.
• Use the idea of Section 6.12 to have a genera-
tive model for each county. The generative
model for a county can produce on demand a
large number of “test vote tallies” for the set
of all ballots cast in that county, that are con-
sistent with and similar to the tallies for the
ballots sampled in that county.
• Combine the generative models for each county
to gives an overall generative model for the
contest. The overall generative model for the
contest can produce on demand a large number
of “test vote tallies” for the contest as a whole.
Combining the county-level test vote tallies is
easily done: they are just added to produce the
contest-level test vote tally.
• Use the generative model for the overall con-
test to estimate the probability that the re-
ported contest outcome is wrong, and thus to
determine whether or not to stop the audit.
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7.1 Sampling
This section explains how sampling may be ar-
ranged for a Bayesian audit of a multijurisdictional
contest.
The overall Bayesian audit procedure, like any
statistical tabulation audit procedure, has an outer
loop involving drawing samples of votes, examining
them, and invoking a stopping rule to determine if
the audit has finished.
With a multijurisdictional contest, the audi-
tor has to decide whether to sample all juris-
dictions at the same rate (proportionate sam-
pling), or whether to accommodate or arrange dif-
ferent sampling rates for for different jurisdictions
(disproportionate sampling).
This is a familiar issue with stratified sampling
[69]. There are guidelines for some applications,
such as “Neyman allocation”, (see e.g. [19]) for de-
ciding how large a sample to draw from each stra-
tum. Those methods do not quite apply here, how-
ever, since the outcome rule may be rather arbitrary
and since the variances of the fraction of votes for
each possible choice are unknown.
Bayesian audits are flexible in this regard, as pro-
portionate sampling is not required. Different juris-
dictions may sample votes at different rates, as long
as the sampling in various jurisdictions is random
and independent of each other.
We envision that some optimization code could
be used to plan the sampling strategy. This would
allow some counties to be sampled more heavily
than others, if this would yield a more efficient au-
dit overall.
Or, each county still having contests-under-audit
could continue to examine ballots at the maximum
rate of which it is capable of examining ballots, even
if this rate varies between counties.
In any case, the flexibility afforded by Bayesian
audits enables the county-level results to be
smoothly integrated into state-wide risk measure-
ments.
7.2 Mixed contests
The Bayesian approach even applies smoothly in a
multijurisdictional setting when some counties do
not have CVRs, while others do have CVRs.
One might think that a contest having some
counties with no CVRs available would of necessity
have to be audited using a ballot-polling approach
for all counties (even those that have CVRs). How-
ever, the flexibility afforded by Bayesian audits al-
lows one to audit contests having counties of mixed
types (where some counties have CVRs and some
do not).
The idea is again the same: each county (whether
having CVRs or not) has a generative model for
test vote tallies for the votes in its county. County-
level test vote tallies can be combined to produce a
contest-level test vote tally. By producing enough
contest-level test vote tallies, the auditor can mea-
sure the probability that the reported contest out-
come is wrong.
This approach makes sense for states such as
Connecticut, where some jurisdictions use scanners
while while other jurisdictions hand-counted their
paper ballots.
8 Variants
8.1 Multiple contests
Multiple contests can be audited concurrently using
these methods.
A “global order” of all ballots can be com-
puted that determines the order in which ballots
are sampled. This global order is independent of
contest—it might, for example, be determined by a
pseudo-random “ballot key” computing by apply-
ing SHA256 to the ballot location. Ballots with
smaller ballot keys are examined first. This allows
the auditing of different contests to be synergistic;
a ballot pulled for one contest audit is likely to also
be useful for another contest audit.
When a ballot is examined, choices for all rele-
vant (still-being-audited) contests on the same bal-
lot are determined by hand. While each individ-
ual contest is being audited independently, for ef-
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ficiency data collection is performed in parallel—
when a ballot is audited all still-being-audited con-
tests are examined and recorded.
Assumption 10 [Concurrent audits share
sampled ballots.] We assume that when a ballot
is selected by the audit for manual examination,
the auditor records the choices made by the voter
on that ballot for (at least) all contests under audit.
The audits for the relevant contests make
progress in parallel; some may terminate earlier
than others.
When all audits have terminated, or all votes
have been examined for all contests still being au-
dited, the audit stops.
8.2 Working with sampling rates for dif-
ferent contests
In a multi-contest election, some contests may be
landslides, while others may be close.
In a multi-jurisdiction election, the jurisdictions
for one contest may include only some of the juris-
dictions for another contest.
Our assumption above means that votes for a
given contest may be sampled at different rates for
different jurisdictions. Even though contest R is not
close, there may be a close contest S such that the
jurisdictions common to S and R include only some
of the jurisdictions for R. The votes in the common
jurisdictions may be sampled at a high rate, just for
the auditing of contest S. The auditing of contest
R in its other jurisdictions may not need to be at
such a high rate.
The flexibility of the Bayesian auditing procedure
can accommodate such situations, since not all of
the jurisdictions for a contest need be sampled at
the same rate. Any sampling within a jurisdiction,
at any rate, allows a generative model to be created
for that race for that jurisdiction. Generative mod-
els for different jurisdictions can be combined, even
if they were derived from samples produced with
different sampling rates.
8.3 Planning sampling rates for different
jurisdictions with multiple contests
The sampling rate in a jurisdiction might be deter-
mined by the “closest” contest in that jurisdiction.
For non-plurality contests, it might be tricky to de-
termine such a “closest” contest.
An extension to the workload estimation method
of Section 6.14 may be used to assist with planning
the sampling rates for different jurisdictions.
Suppose the audit has already examined a num-
ber of ballots in each jurisdiction.
Using this as a basis, one can estimate the proba-
bility for each contest that the reported outcome is
wrong for various projected sampling rates within
the jurisdictions. One can then use optimization
methods to estimate how to minimize the total
number of ballots that need to be audited
in order to complete the auditing of all con-
tests.
The optimization output would specify the es-
timated number of additional ballots one should
audit in each jurisdiction. A search might start
with very large sample size for each jurisdiction,
which will cause the estimated probability that the
reported outcome is wrong for each contest to be
below the Bayesian risk limit. Then a simple op-
timization method that does not use derivatives
can be used to repeatedly reduce each jurisdiction’s
sample size a bit while maintaining the fact that all
contests have estimated probabilities for having in-
correct reported outcomes below the Bayesian risk
limit. At each point one runs the basic computa-
tion of probabilities that the reported outcomes are
wrong for each contest (which is at the heart of the
Bayesian stopping rule computation). The step size
of the optimization would decrease as the optimiza-
tion proceeds. While this should work, other opti-
mization approaches may be even more efficient.
The discussion of the previous paragraph is alto-
gether too brief; elaborations will be provided in a
later version of this note.
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9 Discussion
9.1 Open problems
We have not addressed here the situation that some
jurisdictions may have collections of paper ballots
that are impure with respect to one or more con-
tests. By this we mean that a collection of paper
ballots has some ballots containing a contest, and
some ballots not containing that contest. For ex-
ample, a county may receive vote-by-mail ballots,
and process them in a way that leaves them un-
sorted by ballot style. Thus, it may not be possible
to efficiently sample ballots containing a particular
contest. It is not obvious what the best approach
might be for auditing such contests.
9.2 Security
When the tabulation audit spans more than a single
precinct, it requires coordination and communica-
tion between the various units. Such coordination
and communication should be secured, lest the au-
dit process itself become an attack target. This is
an area that is not yet well studied in the literature,
although standard approaches (e.g. encryption and
and digital signatures, public web sites) should ap-
ply.
9.3 Pros and Cons
Pros: Bayesian tabulation audits have a number
of benefits:
1. Independence of outcome rule. Bayesian
audits do not require that the elections be plu-
rality elections. They are “black-box” audit
methods: all that is required is that the out-
come rule be one that can be applied to a vote
tally.
2. Handling of different collection types, or
different types of voting systems, even
within the same contest. As states move
to the next generation of equipment, it may
well happen that for a given state-wide contest
some collections will have CVRs and some will
not. The Bayesian audit methods can easily
handle such situations. It can also handle col-
lections that are completely hand-counted. (It
is a policy decision as to whether a collection
of paper ballots that has already been hand-
counted needs to be audited.)
3. Ease of audit management. Since one
does not need to sample all collections at the
same fixed rate, audit management is simpli-
fied. Collections can be guided, but not re-
quired, to sample at the same rate.
4. Risk measurement is automatic. Bayesian
audit methods automatically provide a mea-
sure of the “risk” at each point: the risk is the
(posterior) probability that an outcome other
than the reported outcome would actually win
the contest if/when all ballots are examined by
hand.
If the audit has to “stop early” for some reason
(lack of time or resources), you have a mean-
ingful “audit result” to publish, even it it not
satisfactorily strong. For example, you might
end up saying, “The reported contest winner
Alice has an 80% chance of winning according
to the posterior, while Bob has a 20% chance
of winning. Further sampling would be needed
to improve this result. Unfortunately, we did
not meet our goal of showing that the reported
contest winner has a 95% or better chance of
winning according to the posterior.”
5. Reproducibility. Citizens or independent ex-
perts can reproduce the simulations and audit
computations to verify that the audit was cor-
rectly conducted. (Doing so requires having all
audit data from the examined ballots, as well
as requiring that that all random number gen-
eration was performed from public seeds or de-
rived from a public master random audit seed.)
On the other hand, we note the following disad-
vantages:
1. Simulation-based: Interpreting the sampled
votes to derive the audit conclusions requires
some software and computer time. However,
the software can be written by any third party
and publicly disclosed for anyone to use. The
computation required is cheap, compared to
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the manual labor required to retrieve and in-
terpret ballots.
2. Math: These methods requires a bit of math
and statistics to understand. But this is true
for any statistical tabulation audit.
10 Related work
Chilingirian et al. [8] describe the design, imple-
mentation, and testing of an audit system based
on the use of Bayesian audits for the Australian
2016 Senate elections. Because of the complexity of
the Australian voting system [66], the “black box”
character of Bayesian election audits was especially
appealing. Unfortunately, the Australian Election
Commission decided not to proceed with the actual
audit (probably for political rather than technical
reasons).
A statistical tabulation audit may be viewed as
a sequential decision-making procedure as de-
scribed by Wald [62, 63].
Acknowledgments
The author gratefully acknowledges support for his
work on this project received from the Center for
Science of Information (CSoI), an NSF Science and
Technology Center, under grant agreement CCF-
0939370.
I thank Philip Stark for his pioneering work on
risk-limiting audits, on which much of the current
paper is modeled, and for hosting me at U.C. Berke-
ley during the fall term 2016 during my sabbatical,
where we had many enjoyable and extended discus-
sions about election auditing.
I also thank Neal McBurnett, Harvie Branscomb,
John McCarthy, Lynn Garland and the many oth-
ers who have been educating me about the complex-
ities of auditing Colorado elections and who have
provided comments on earlier drafts of this note.
Thanks also to Berj Chillingirian for helpful feed-
back on earlier drafts, and Stephanie Singer for
her detailed reading and many constructive sugges-
tions.
References
[1] R. Michael Alvarez, Lonna Atkeson, and
Thad E. Hall. Confirming Elections: Creat-
ing Confidence and Integrity through Election
Auditing. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
[2] Javed Aslam, Raluca A. Popa, and Ronald L.
Rivest. On auditing elections when precincts
have different sizes. In D. Dill and T. Kohno,
editors, Proc. 2008 USENIX/ACCURATE
Electronic Voting Technology Work-
shop. USENIX/ACCURATE, 2008. See
http://www.usenix.org/events/evt08/
tech/full_papers/aslam/aslam.pdf.
[3] J. Benaloh, D. Jones, E. Lazarus, M. Lin-
deman, and P.B. Stark. SOBA: Secrecy-
preserving observable ballot-level audit. In
Proceedings 2011 Electronic Voting Tech-
nology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy
Elections (EVT/WOTE ’11), 2011. http:
//static.usenix.org/events/evtwote11/
tech/final_files/Benaloh.pdf.
[4] James O. Berger. Statistical Decision Theory
and Bayesian Analysis. Springer, 2010.
[5] Steven Brams. Mathematics and Democracy:
Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division
Procedures. Princeton, 2008.
[6] J. Bretschneider, S. Flaherty, S. Goodman,
M. Halvorson, R. Johnston, M. Lindeman,
R.L. Rivest, P. Smith, and P.B. Stark. Risk-
limiting post-election audits: Why and how?,
Oct. 2012. (ver. 1.1) http://people.csail.
mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RLAWG12.
[7] S. Checkoway, A. Sarwate, and H. Shacham.
Single-ballot risk-limiting audits using
convex optimization. In D. Jones, J.-J.
Quisquater, and E. Rescorla, editors, Pro-
ceedings 2010 EVT/WOTE Conference.
USENIX/ACCURATE/IAVoSS, August 2010.
[8] Berj Chilingirian, Zara Perumal, Ronald L.
Rivest, Grahame Bowland, Andrew Conway,
Philip B. Stark, Michelle Blom, Chris Cul-
nane, and Vanessa Teague. Auditing Aus-
tralian Senate ballots. CoRR, abs/1610.00127,
2016. arxiv.org/abs/1610.00127.
37
[9] U.S. Congress. Help America Vote Act of
2002 . https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/
HAVA41.PDF, 2002.
[10] B. Efron. Bootstrap methods: Another look at
the jackknife. Annals of Statistics, 7(1):1–26,
1979.
[11] Bradley Efron. The Jackknife, the Bootstrap,
and Other Resampling Plans. SIAM, 1982. No.
38 in CBMS-NFS Regional Conference Series
in Applied Math.
[12] Bradley Efron and R.J. Tibshirani. An Intro-
duction to the Bootstrap. Chapman & Hall
/ CRC, 1993. Monographs on Statistics and
Probability 57.
[13] FairVote. Better elections are possible. http:
//www.fairvote.org/.
[14] Overseas Vote Foundation. The future of vot-
ing: End-to-end verifiable internet voting —
specification and feasibility study. (I was on
the Advisory Council for this report.).
[15] San Francisco. June 2016 1% manual tally
- dice. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
Sufb7ykByWA.
[16] San Francisco. Random selection of the 1%
for manual tally - June 2016. https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=sdWL8Unz5kM.
[17] Eric Geller. Online voting is a cybersecurity
nightmare. Daily Dot, June 10 2016. https://
www.dailydot.com/layer8/online-voting-
cybersecurity-election-fraud-hacking/.
[18] J. L. Hall, L. W. Miratrix, P. B. Stark,
M. Briones, E. Ginnold, F. Oakley, M. Peaden,
G. Pellerin, T. Stanionis, and T. Webber.
Implementing risk-limiting post-election au-
dits in California. In Proc. 2009 Electronic
Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on
Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ’09,
Montreal, Canada). USENIX, Aug 2009.
http://www.usenix.org/event/evtwote09/
tech/full_papers/hall.pdf.
[19] H. F. Huddleston, P. L. Claypool, and R. R.
Hocking. Optimal sample allocation to strata
using convex programming. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society (Series C), 19(3):273–
278, 1970.
[20] K. Johnson. Election verification by statistical
audit of voter-verified paper ballots. http://
ssrn.com/abstract=640943, Oct. 31 2004.
[21] Douglas Jones. The Machinery of Democracy:
Protecting Elections in an Electronic World,
chapter Voting Machine Testing (Appendix E).
Voting Right and Elections. Brennan Center
for Justice (NYU School of Law), June 27,
2006. http://homepage.divms.uiowa.edu/
~jones/voting/testing/#parallel.
[22] Douglas W. Jones. On optical mark-sense
scanning. In D. Chaum et al., editor,
Towards Trustworthy Elections, volume
6000 of Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 175–190. Springer, 2010. See
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/
OpticalMarkSenseScanning.pdf.
[23] Douglas W. Jones. A brief illustrated history of
voting. http://homepage.divms.uiowa.edu/
~jones/voting/pictures/, 2013.
[24] Douglas W. Jones and Barbara Simons. Bro-
ken Ballots: Will Your Vote Count? Center
for the Study of Language and Information,
2012.
[25] M. Lindeman, M. Halvorseon, P. Smith,
L. Garland, V. Addona, and D. McCrea. Prin-
ciple and best practices for post-election au-
dits. www.electionaudits.org/files/best%
20practices%20final_0.pdf, 2008.
[26] Mark Lindeman and Philip B. Stark. A gen-
tle introduction to risk-limiting audits. IEEE
Security and Privacy, 10:42–49, 2012.
[27] Mark Lindeman, Philip B. Stark, and Vin-
cent S. Yates. BRAVO: Ballot-polling risk-
limiting audits to verify outcomes. In Alex
Halderman and Olivier Pereira, editors, Pro-
ceedings 2012 EVT/WOTE Conference, 2012.
[28] Randall Munroe. Frequentists vs. Bayesians
. https://www.explainxkcd.com/wiki/
index.php/1132:_Frequentists_vs.
_Bayesians, Nov. 9, 2012.
38
[29] Randall Munroe. What If?: Serious Scien-
tific Answers to Absurd Hypothetical Ques-
tions. Houghton Mifflin, 2014. See https://
what-if.xkcd.com/19/ for discussion of ties.
[30] Kevin P. Murphy. Machine Learning: A Prob-
abilistic Perspective. MIT Press, 2012.
[31] C. Andrew Neff. Election confidence: A
comparison of methodologies and their
relative effectiveness at achieving it.
www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/
20031217.neff.electionconfidence.pdf,
2003.
[32] Lawrence Norden, Aaron Burstein,
Joseph Lorenzo Hall, and Margaret Chen.
Post-election audits: Restoring trust in elec-
tions. Technical report, Brennan Center for
Justice and Samuelson Law, Technology &
Public Policy Clinic, 2007.
[33] National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST). NIST randomness beacon. https:
//beacon.nist.gov/home.
[34] National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). Secure hashing.
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/
toolkit/secure_hashing.html, 2015.
[35] National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST). Random bit genera-
tion. https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/
Random-Bit-Generation, 2017.
[36] California Secretary of State. Post-
election risk-limiting audit pilot program,
2011-2013. http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/voting-systems/oversight/
post-election-auditing-regulations-
and-reports/post-election-risk-
limiting-audit-pilot-program/.
[37] Colorado Secretary of State. Determination
of voter intent. www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/
elections/docs/voterIntentGuide.pdf,
September 8, 2017.
[38] Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams.
Audit center. https://www.sos.state.
co.us/pubs/elections/auditCenter.html,
2017.
[39] Jeremy Orloff and Jonathan Bloom. Com-
parison of frequentist and Bayesian infer-
ence. Course notes for MIT course 18.05
Spring 2014, Class 20. Available at: https:
//ocw.mit.edu/courses/mathematics/18-
05-introduction-to-probability-and-
statistics-spring-2014/readings/MIT18_
05S14_Reading20.pdf, 2014.
[40] Ronald L. Rivest. On the notion of ‘soft-
ware independence’ in voting systems. Philo-
sophical Transactions of The Royal Society A,
366(1881):3759–3767, August 6, 2008.
[41] Ronald L. Rivest. Reference implemen-
tation code for pseudo-random sampler.
https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/
sampler.py, 2011.
[42] Ronald L. Rivest. How to Check Election
Results (feat. Polya’s Urn) . YouTube Num-
berphile interview by Brady Haran., November
7, 2016. Available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ZM-i8t4pMK0.
[43] Ronald L. Rivest. ClipAudit—a simple post-
election risk-limiting audit. https://arxiv.
org/abs/1701.08312, 2017.
[44] Ronald L. Rivest and Emily Shen. A
Bayesian method for auditing elections. In
J. Alex Halderman and Olivier Pereira, ed-
itors, Proceedings 2012 EVT/WOTE Con-
ference, 2012. Available at https://www.
usenix.org/conference/evtwote12.
[45] Ronald L. Rivest and Philip B. Stark. Black-
box post-election audits. (Available from au-
thors.).
[46] Ronald L. Rivest and John P. Wack. On the
notion of “software independence” in voting
systems. Prepared for the TGDC, and posted
by NIST at the given url.
[47] Roy G. Saltman. The History and Politics of
Voting Technology: In Quest of Integrity and
Public Confidence. Palgrame Macmillan, 2006.
[48] A. D. Sarwate, S. Checkoway, and H. Shacham.
Risk-limiting audits and the margin of victory
in nonplurality elections. Politics and Policy,
3(3):29–64, 2013.
39
[49] P. B. Stark. Risk-limiting vote-tabulation au-
dits: The importance of cluster size. Chance,
23(3):9–12, 2010.
[50] P. B. Stark and D. A. Wagner. Evidence-
based elections. IEEE Security and Privacy,
10(05):33–41, Sep-Oct 2012.
[51] Philip B. Stark. Conservative statistical post-
election audits. Ann. Appl. Stat., 2:550–581,
2008.
[52] Philip B. Stark. A sharper discrepancy mea-
sure for post-election audits. Ann. Appl. Stat.,
2:982–985, 2008.
[53] Philip B. Stark. CAST: Canvass audits by
sampling and testing. IEEE Trans. Inform.
Forensics and Security, 4(4):708–717, Dec.
2009.
[54] Philip B. Stark. Efficient post-election au-
dits of multiple contests: 2009 California tests.
ssrn.com/abstract=1443314, 2009. 2009
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies.
[55] Philip B. Stark. Risk-limiting post-election
audits: P-values from common probability in-
equalities. IEEE Trans. on Information Foren-
sics and Security, 4:1005–1014, 2009.
[56] Philip B. Stark. Super-simple simulta-
neous single-ballot risk-limiting audits.
In Proc. 2010 EVT/WOTE Workshop,
2010. http://www.usenix.org/events/
evtwote10/tech/full_papers/Stark.pdf.
[57] Philip B. Stark. Tools for com-
parison risk-limiting election audits.
http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/
Vote/auditTools.htm, 2015.
[58] Philip B. Stark and Vanessa Teague. Veri-
able european elections: Risk-limiting audits
for d’hondt and its relatives. USENIX Journal
of Election Technology and Systems (JETS),
1(3):18–39, 2014.
[59] Than Tibbetts and Steve Mullis. Chal-
lenged ballots—you be the judge. http:
//minnesota.publicradio.org/features/
2008/11/19_challenged_ballots/, 2008.
[60] T. N. Tideman. Independence of clones as a
criterion for voting rules. Social Choice and
Welfare, 4(3):185–206, 1987.
[61] Verified Voting. Post election audits.
https://www.verifiedvoting.org/
resources/post-election-audits/.
[62] A. Wald. Sequential tests of statistical hy-
potheses. Ann. Math. Stat., 16(2):117–186,
1945.
[63] A. Wald. Sequential analysis. Dover (Mineola,
New York), 2004.
[64] Wikipedia. Comparison of electoral sys-
tems. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Comparison_of_electoral_systems.
[65] Wikipedia. Electoral system. https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Electoral_system.
[66] Wikipedia. Electoral system of Aus-
tralia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Electoral_system_of_Australia.
[67] Wikipedia. Gamma distribution. https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamma_distribution.
[68] Wikipedia. Optical scan voting system.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optical_
scan_voting_system.
[69] Wikipedia. Stratified sampling. https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stratified_
sampling.
A Appendix A. Election com-
plexities
Elections can be complicated, and audits, which
aim to check the correctness of a election contest
outcomes, inherit that complexity. Such complex-
ity derives from having:
• multiple contests,
• multiple candidates per contest (with voters
perhaps allowed to write-in candidates not oth-
erwise listed on the ballot)
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• multiple modes of casting paper ballots (in-
person, vote-by-mail (VBM), voting with drop-
off boxes), with some vote-by-mail ballots pos-
sibly arriving several days late but still within
the deadline for acceptance,
• multiple administrative jurisdictions (state,
counties, cities, precincts, other),
• contests spanning some jurisdictions and not
others,
• multiple types of equipment (for example,
some scanners produce one electionic cast vote
record (CVR) per vote scanned, while other
scanners only produce tallies per candidate of
votes scanned),
• a variety of methods for organizing and storing
the cast paper ballots, including those that mix
together ballots of various ballot styles
• some elections having so many contests that a
single ballot may need to be printed on two or
more separate cards,
• limited resources and tight deadlines,
• the nature of most statistical audit methods to
have resource and time requirements that have
considerable variability (from looking at just a
handful of votes in a landslide contest to hand-
counting of all cast paper votes in a very close
contest),
• statistical audit methods that may be rel-
atively sophisticated and difficult to under-
stand, even if easy to apply,
• statistical audit methods that are sequential
decision-making in flavor, requiring dynamic
real-time computations during the audit (even
if simple) to decide when to stop the audit,
• statistical audit methods requiring the coordi-
nation of sampling and hand-examination of a
number of widely separated collections of pa-
per votes,
• the possible need for custom software just to
support the audit,
• a need to provide transparency while protect-
ing the privacy of voters’ choices, and
• a need to provide straightforward evidence that
the contest outcome(s) are correct, while acco-
modating these complexities.
B Appendix B. Math
This appendix gives some mathematical details,
clarifications, and elaborations of the Bayesian au-
dit method presented above. We follow the nota-
tional conventions of Rivest and Shen [44]; see that
paper for more detailed notation and discussions.
We assume here that we are dealing with just a
single contest in a single jurisdiction.
B.1 Notation
Here we restrict attention to a single contest.
Number of cast votes
Notation 1 We let n denote the total number of
cast votes in the contest.
Number of possible choices for a vote
Notation 2 We let t denote the number of possi-
ble choices a paper vote may exhibit.
This is the number of possibilities for an “actual
vote”—what a manual examination of the paper
ballot would reveal. It may be the actual vote is
“invalid” or “overvote” or “undervote” or the like,
so that the number t of possible choices might be
slightly larger than needed to cover just the possible
valid votes.
We identify the t possible votes with the integers
1, 2, . . . , t.
With plurality voting on m candidates, there are
t = m possible votes (possibly plus one or two for
undervotes or invalid votes), and M = m possible
contest outcomes.
With preferential or ranked-choice voting, each
cast vote provides a listing of the m candidates in
some order, so there are t = m! possible votes (plus
one or two for invalid votes), but only M = m pos-
sible contest outcomes.
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Vote sequences We denote the (overall ac-
tual) vote sequence of cast votes (for a single
jurisdiction) as
a = {a1, a2, . . . , an} ,
where each ai is a vote (an integer in {1, 2, . . . , t}).
The vote sequence is best viewed as a sequence
rather than as a set, since there may be repeated
items (identical votes), and we may need to index
into the sequence to select random votes for audit-
ing.
Tallies If a is a vote sequence, we let
tally(a) = A = (A1, A2, . . . , At)
denote the tally of a, giving for each i the number
Ai of cast votes for choice i. The sum of the tally
elements is equal to n, the number of cast votes.
Similarly, we let
voteshare(a) = (A′1, A
′
2, . . . , A
′
t)
= (A1/n,A2/n, . . . , At/n)
denote the voteshare of a, giving the fraction A′i
of cast votes for each possible choice i. The sum of
the voteshares is equal to 1.
B.2 Probability distributions
The auditor can represent his uncertainty as a prob-
ability distribution over possible vote sequences
containing the correct number of cast votes.
We assume that a tally is a sequence of t nonneg-
ative integers that sum to n.
Dirichlet-multinomial distributions The ap-
proach given here is modeled on the use of a
Dirichlet-multinomial distribution, a rather stan-
dard approach. Such distributions are frequently
used in machine learning; see Murphy [30].
We use multivariate Dirichlet-multinomial distri-
butions to model the auditor’s information and un-
certainty about the voteshares for the vote sequence
(which is really all about his uncertainty about the
voteshares in the nonsample).
Such distributions are Dirichlet on the multino-
mial probabilities, then multinomial on the counts.
We denote the Dirichlet hyperparameters as
α = (α1, α2, . . . , αt) .
These hyperparameters are nonnegative real values.
There are t hyperparameters, one for each of the
possible votes for the contest being audited.
For a given vector of hyperparameters α, the
Dirichlet distribution is a probability distribution
over the simplex St of t-tuples of nonnegative real
numbers adding up to 1. In our case, the Dirichlet
distribution is a probabilistic model of the multino-
mial probabilities defined on the set of choices.
The mean of the Dirichlet distribution is
(x1, x2, . . . , xt), where xi = αi/
∑
i αi. That is, the
mean voteshare for choice i is proportional to αi,
normalized so that the xi values add up to 1.
B.3 Prior probabilities
The choice of prior is always an interesting one for
a Bayesian.
Since we are using a Dirichlet distribution to rep-
resent what the auditor knows about the voteshares
for the cast vote sequence, the prior probability
distribution is defined by the choice of the Dirich-
let hyperparameters. Choosing a prior is done by
choosing the initial set of hyperparameters for the
Dirichlet distribution.
In this subsection we discuss the choice of prior,
noting that one may wish to take some different
approaches for ballot-polling Bayesian audits and
for comparison Bayesian audits.
In the main body of this note, we avoiding talk-
ing about prior distributions, effectively setting to
zero all of the hyperparameters for the prior. Hav-
ing all hyperparameters set to zero yields the Hal-
dane prior, which is a reasonable choice for ballot-
polling audits when the initial sample size is not too
small. As we now discuss, other choices may also
be reasonable, even for a ballot-polling audit. And
different choices may be best for a comparison au-
dit.
A Bayesian has an initial (or prior) “belief state”
represented as his prior probability distribution on
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the set of possible voteshare distributions. Once he
sees data (the sample of cast votes seen in the au-
dit), he updates his belief state, using Bayes Rule,
to become his final (or posterior) distribution.
With a Dirichlet distribution, this update is
exceptionally simple. The initial distribution is
represented by the initial hyperparameters, one
per possible choice for the contest. These ini-
tial hyperparameters are commonly viewed as
“pseudocounts,” for reasons that will become im-
mediately clear. When a sample is examined, each
hyperparameter is increased by the count of the
number of times its corresponding choice is seen
in the sample [30, Section 3.4]. The resulting set
of hyperparameters defines the final (or posterior)
Dirichlet distribution.
For example, suppose we have a contest between
Alice and Bob, and suppose further that a Bayesian
observer has initial hyperparameters of 5 for Alice
and 6 for Bob. The observer then sees a random
sample of cast votes having 10 votes for Alice and 15
votes for Bob. The observer’s posterior distribution
then has hyperparameters of 15 for Alice and 21 for
Bob.
The initial hyperparameters (“pseudocounts”)
behave just like “virtual sample counts.” If you
start with a Haldane prior (initial hyperparameters
equal to 0) and see a sample with 10 votes for Alice
and 15 votes for Bob, you end up with final hyper-
parameters of 10 for Alice and 15 for Bob. If instead
we set the initial hyperparameters to 10 for Alice
and 15 for Bob, we achieve the same result, with-
out having seen any sample. In this way the initial
hyperparameters can be viewed as representing the
observer’s degree of belief about the possible distri-
bution of voteshares as equivalent to the observer
having seen a “virtual sample” of cast votes.
The final hyperparameters for one stage of the
audit become the initial hyperparameters for the
next stage of the audit, so the hyperparameters act
during the audit as counters for the number of votes
seen for each possible choice, where these counters
have initial values set equal to the initial hyperpa-
rameters.
The reader may be concerned that biasing the
initial hyperparameters in favor of one candidate
or another may be like “stuffing the ballot box”—
making it seem more likely that one candidate
or another appears to be winning the contest.
This is a valid concern. We therefore re-
quire that the auditor use “neutral” ini-
tial hyperparameters–ones that give equal
weight to each choice capable of winning the
contest.
The initial hyperparameters do not need to give
an equal weight for choices that can’t win the con-
test. For example, the initial hyperparameters
might give Alice and Bob each hyperparameters
equal to 2, while giving “undervote” a hyperparam-
eter equal to 0.
The intuition that the initial hyperparameters
correspond to the observer having seen a “virtual
sample” of the data is also a good one in the follow-
ing sense: as the hyperparameters increase in value,
the Dirichlet distribution becomes more tightly con-
centrated about its mean. A Dirichlet distribution
with hyperparameters of 10 for Alice and 20 for
Bob has the same mean as one with hyperparame-
ters of 100 for Alice and 200 for Bob, which is the
point where Alice gets 1/3 of the voteshare and Bob
gets 2/3. But the second Dirchlet distribution has
smaller variance in the voteshare parameters. This
makes sense, as more sample data makes for better
estimates.
Let us call the sum of the initial hyperparameters
the “initial size” (of the hyperparameters), and
let us call the number of cast votes in a sample the
“sample size.” We call them both “size” since
they are comparable measures: one of the strength
of the initial belief, and the other of the strength of
the data.
As he increases the initial size, the Bayesian is
giving greater weight to his initial beliefs. As he
increases the sample size, the Bayesian is giving
greater weight to the observed data. Eventually,
with enough data, the sample overwhelms any ini-
tial beliefs.
Choosing a Dirichlet prior distribution (that is,
the initial hyperparameters) may be done in a two-
step manner:
1. [Choose initial size.] Choose the initial size
of the hyperparameters (that is, their sum) to
reflect the desired strength of initial belief.
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2. [Choose individual hyperparameters.]
Allocate the initial size among the individual
hyperparameters to reflect the initial expecta-
tions for the corresponding voteshares. (For
a Bayesian audit, however, the individual hy-
perparameters for all possibly-winning choices
must be set equal to each other, so as not to
bias the audit.)
For example, an auditor might choose initial hy-
perparameters of 1 each for Alice and Bob, and 0
for “undervote.” This choice of hyperparameters
has an initial size of 2—the auditor is saying that
his prior distribution is fairly weak and that it is
unbiased.
For a Bayesian audit, it makes sense to have a
weak prior (that is, with a small initial size). The
audit should be governed primarily by the data,
and not by the prior. Even if all of the candidates
have equal initial hyperparameters, having large hy-
perparameter values would slow down the audit by
requiring the sample to be correspondingly larger.
One reason for choosing nonzero initial hyperpa-
rameters is that if a hyperparameter for candidate
X is zero, that component of the Dirichlet distribu-
tion is initially set to zero as well. That is, the ini-
tial distribution effectively assumes that candidate
X won’t be getting any votes at all. When the hy-
perparameter is positive, the distribution assumes
that the candidate will be getting votes in propor-
tion to its hyperparameter. If every candidate may
get some votes, then nonzero hyperparameters for
the candidates is reasonable.
A common choice for Bayesian inference is to use
a Jeffreys prior, which sets each hyperparame-
ter to 1/2. The initial size of this hyperparameter
setting is t/2. We can recommend this choice for
plurality elections.
The Haldane prior, which sets all initial hyper-
parameters to zero, is another reasonable choice,
and is the one described in the body of this note. I
suggest that its use is reasonable as long as the ini-
tial sample size is large enough so that candidates
who reasonably might win the contest obtain some
votes in the initial sample.
We note that this is known as an improper prior
(a term of art in the field), but using such improper
priors within a Bayesian framework is not unusual.
A Haldane prior is simplest prior to implement.
One reason the Haldane prior is attractive is that
it works smoothly when there are large number of
possible choices for a vote, such as for preferential
voting.
Using the Haldane prior here may also be viewed
as an application of the commonly-used empiri-
cal Bayes method, wherein parameters defining
the prior distribution are inferred from the sample
rather than chosen before seeing any data.
The pilot study of auditing the Australian Senate
elections [8] used the empirical Bayes method in this
manner.
Priors for Bayesian comparison audits. How
should one set up a Bayesian prior for a compari-
son audit?
As described in Section 6.13, a Bayesian compar-
ison audit tallies (reported vote, actual vote) pairs,
where the reported vote is from the CVR and the
actual vote is from the hand examination of the
corresponding paper ballot.
If there are t choices possible for a contest (in-
cluding the non-candidate choices such as “under-
vote”), then there are t2 tallies being kept by the
audit, one for each possible such pair of (reported
vote, actual vote). We may think of these tallies
as forming a matrix, with one row for each possi-
ble reported vote and one column for each possible
actual vote.
There will also be t2 hyperparameters, one for
each tally position—that is, one hyperparameter for
each position in the tally matrix. The hyperparam-
eters may be viewed as initial “pseudocounts” as
before for the tallies.
The diagonal of the tally matrix gives the counts
for votes read without error—where the reported
vote is equal to the actual vote. The off-diagonal
elements give counts for votes read with error—
where the reported vote is not equal to the actual
vote.
The principle of neutrality means that the hyper-
parameters along the diagonal should all be equal—
no candidate is believed initially to be more likely
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to win the contest.
As described in Section 6.13, the Bayesian com-
parison audit proceeds as if it were m separate
audits—one for each possible reported vote.
The tally matrix is split up row-wise into m sep-
arate rows, each row giving the tally for its own
subaudit (where all of the reported votes are equal).
The voteshare distribution for a given row will
be highly skewed. We expect one entry (from the
diagonal) to have the overwhelming majority of the
votes, while the others (from off-diagonal) to have
tiny tallies.
A reasonable hyperparameter setting in such a
case might be to use 50 for the hyperparameter for
the on-diagonal cell, and to use 0.5 (or some other
small value) for the off-diagonal elements.
These values may be chosen so that:
• The sum of all the entries in the initial tally
matrix is roughly the number of votes for which
the auditor feels that the evidence (votes exam-
ined and interpreted by hand) should begin to
balance out the prior.
• The ratio of the sum of the off-diagonal el-
ements to the diagonal element should be
roughly equal to (or a bit greater than) the ex-
pected error rate in the ballots examined. For
example, with a two-candidate race, the ratio
0.5/50 = 0.01 corresponds to a prior estimate
of an error rate of one percent.
We note that
• Although these pseudocounts affect the tallies
as seen by the audit, they are symmetric with
respect to the candidates. Thus these pseu-
docounts do not favor any one candidate over
another.
• The pseudocounts ”smooth out” the tallies
when the sample sizes are small, by blending
the pseudocounts with the actual counts seen
during the audit. For example, if the audit
had examined two ballots, both of which were
”Yes” ballots, one shouldn’t conclude that the
voting was unanimously for ”Yes”! With the
pseudocounts added in, the voting appears to
the audit as 52/50, where Yes has 52 votes and
No has 50. Clearly more auditing needs to be
done to tell the difference now!
• The sum of all the pseudocounts in the ma-
trix (in this case 50+1+1+50=102) determines
how much the prior is weighted compared to
the new audit data. In this case, it will take
about 102 ballots examined to have as much
weight as the prior has been given by the pseu-
docounts.
Priors for preferential voting. Priors for pref-
erential voting are more complicated, as there are
m! different possible orderings of m candidates.
When m is even modestly large (e.g., m = 10) the
number of possible votes becomes very large.
For both ballot-polling and comparison audits,
the simplest approach is to stick with a Haldane
prior, which gives a 0 hyperparameter to each pos-
sible ordering.
Parallel audits. Rivest and Shen [44] also give
another approaches to using priors. It is possible
run several statistical tabulation audits in parallel:
they all use the same sample data, but have differ-
ent stopping rules. They suggest that one could use
not only a neutral prior (such as the Jeffreys prior
or the Haldane prior), but also one prior biased in
favor of each candidate (that is, with a larger ini-
tial hyperparameter for that candidate). A losing
candidate may need to be convinced that the vot-
ers really elected someone else by seeing that the
data swamps even a prior biased in favor of that
losing candidate. The audit stops when all subau-
dits (with different priors) have terminated. (Note:
parallel audits should not be confused with parallel
testing [21].)
B.4 Updates with Bayes Rule
Bayes rule is used to update the hyperparameters
by adding the sample tally to the prior hyperparam-
eters, as usual. The Haldane prior sets all of the ini-
tial hyperparameters equal to zero, which simplifies
things, so that after update the Dirichlet hyperpa-
rameters are just the tallies for the current sample.
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B.5 Generating test nonsample tallies
When we “sample the posterior” we mean sam-
pling from the Dirichlet distribution defined by the
Dirichlet hyperparameters after they have been up-
dated by Bayes Rule using the observed data. In
our case, since we are using the Haldane prior, these
hyperparameters are just the tallies for the observed
sample. The sample from the Dirichlet distribu-
tion is a test multinomial probability distribution—
a set of nonnegative real numbers adding up to one.
Since our goal here is to generate a test nonsample
tally, we draw a number of (simulated) ballots equal
to the (known) size of the nonsample, where each
ballot has a vote selected at independently at ran-
dom from the set of available options according to
the multinomial probability distribution computed
earlier. The tally of these votes gives us our test
nonsample tally.
Sampling from a Dirichlet distribution A
standard method to generate a multivariate ran-
dom variable distributed according to a Dirichlet
distribution with hyperparameters (α1, α2, . . . , αn)
is as follows:
1. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, generate a random vari-
able xi distributed according a gamma distri-
bution with shape parameter αi and scale
parameter 1 [67].
2. Normalize these values so their sum is one.
That is, replace each xi by xi/v where v is the
sum of the original xi values.
An important property of gamma distributions
is that a random variable distributed according to
gamma distribution with shape parameter k and
scale parameter 1 has expected value k and variance
k.
This property motivates our presentation of
“fuzzing” above in Section 6.10 where a sample tally
equal to k is replaced by a random variable dis-
tributed according to a gamma distribution with
shape k and scale 1.
It is interesting to note that the gamma distribu-
tion with shape parameter one and scale parameter
1 is just an exponential distribution with ex-
pected value 1.
A gamma distribution does not need to have a
shape parameter that is a whole number; it may be
any nonzero real value.
Furthermore, a gamma distribution with shape
parameter k and scale parameter 1 is just the sum
of k exponential distributions each having expected
value one. In general, a gamma distribution with
shape parameter k and scale parameter 1 is the sum
of any finite set of gamma distributions with scale
parameter 1 if their shape parameters add up to k.
This motivates our perspective, also presented in
Section 6.10, of viewing “fuzzing” as replacing the
weight (originally one) of each vote with a ran-
dom variable drawn according to an exponential
distribution with expected value one. It is entirely
equivalent to replacing tallies with the correspond-
ing gamma-distributed random variables.
Alternatives One might reasonably consider al-
ternatives to fuzzing that use something other than
gamma-distributed random variables.
The most significant properties of the gamma dis-
tribution (with shape parameter k and scale factor
1) here are that it has mean k and variance k.
A variable distributed according to a gamma dis-
tribution is nonnegative, which seems a natural
property for our purposes. However, non-negativity
doesn’t seem required (see discussion below on the
use of the normal distribution for fuzzing).
We now present some alternative methods for
fuzzing the sample counts. These methods may
be viewed as good and perhaps amusing heuristic
approximations to the use of the gamma distribu-
tion. They are perhaps best for pedagogic use—the
shuffle-and-cut variation is really easy to explain.
Alternatives worth considering include:
• Using a Binomial distribution with mean k
and probability p = 1/2, scaled up by a fac-
tor of two. This gives values that are non-
negative even integers between zero and 2k;
the mean and variance are both equal to k.
This (scaled) binomial distribution is identi-
cal to the sum of k (scaled) Bernouli random
variables, so we can view the fuzzing operation
here as replacing each ballot’s initial weight
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of one with either 2 or 0, according to a fair
coin flip. (“Double or nothing” for each bal-
lot’s weight.) Equivalently, to obtain a fuzzed
sample merely delete each ballot in the sample
with probability 1/2, and replace it with two
copies of itself with probability 1/2. Another
simple variant on this idea is to “shuffle and
cut”: randomly shuffle (re-order) the sample,
then cut it into two halves. Tally the first half.
Double the tallies to achieve an expected value
and variance of k for each choice that occurs k
times in the original sample.
• Using a normal distribution with mean and
variance both equal to k. Using the normal
distribution has many appealing features; it is
well-studied, is its own conjugate, is additive,
and (by the central limit theorem) represents
the asymptotic limit of many other distribu-
tions. While it may result in fuzzed values
that are negative, I don’t see how this causes
any problems for us, particularly if we are us-
ing the “small sample assumption.” Using the
normal distribution may be viewed as a contin-
uous variant of the binomial distribution given
above.
(Most outcome rules also work fine if some in-
put tallies are negative numbers, since the rules
typically work by comparing tallies with each
other, or by comparing sums of tallies with
sums of other tallies.)
• Using a Poisson distribution with mean k
(which also has variance k). This gives values
that are nonnegative integers. It is also addi-
tive, so that one could view the fuzzing on a
per-ballot basis, where a ballot’s initial weight
of one is replaced by a random variable drawn
according to a Poisson distribution with ex-
pected value one.
• Using a negative binomial distribution
with parameters k and p = 1/2; The proba-
bility of value i is probability of flipping a fair
coin and seeing i heads before you see k tails.
This has integer values with expection k and
variance 2k. It is also additive, so one could
view the fuzzing on a per-ballot basis, where a
ballot’s initial weight of one is replaced by the
number of fair coin flips seen showing heads
before the first tail is seen. The implications
of the higher variance for the negative binomial
need study.
• Using a Polya-Eggenberger distribution
defined by Polya’s Urn model. (See Rivest and
Shen [44] and Rivest [42].)
Interesting as these are, we prefer the use of the
gamma distribution for its familiarity, efficiency,
and ability to handle small non-integral counts as
inputs.
The gamma, normal, and Poisson distributions
all share this last feature—that their distributions
may have a mean that is a small real number. This
feature might be of interest when creating a prior
for comparison audits, where a prior for the errors
may be based on the prior belief that errors will be
rare.
Another related approach worth mentioning here
is bootstrapping, a popular statistical method
(see Efron [10, 11, 12]) that has also been suggested
for tabulation audits (see Rivest and Stark [45]).
Here a sample of size s is transformed into a test
sample of size s by sampling from the original sam-
ple with replacement. The test sample tally can
then be scaled to yield a test nonsample tally as
usual. The statistics are very close to those ob-
tained by using the Poisson distribution. Boot-
strapping is very easy to implement, although the
resampling takes time proportional to the size s of
the sample rather than the length t of the tally.
These alternative methods are good approxima-
tions to the use of gamma-distributed random vari-
ables. However, they can presumably stand on their
own merits as fully-justified Bayesian audits, with
appropriately chosen prior distributions.
Small sample assumption. We now present an-
other simplification of the Bayesian method for use
when the sample size is very small compared to the
nonsample size. We call this the “small sample as-
sumption.” This situation is the typical one when
when contests are not close.
In the small sample case, one may reasonably skip
the step of adding the sample tally to the test non-
sample tally, and just use the test nonsample tally
directly.
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We can implement a Bayesian audit stopping rule
under the small sample assumption by examining
the contest outcomes for many fuzzed versions of
the sample tally (without scaling).
An approach based on the small sample assump-
tion provides an approximate Bayesian foundation
and justification for several of the “black-box au-
dits” proposed by Rivest and Stark [45]).
B.6 Implementation note
Computing gamma variates: Spreadsheet
We note that computing random variables dis-
tributed according to a gamma distribution is very
easy. For example, the following formula gives a
cell in your spreadsheet a random value distributed
according to a gamma distribution with shape pa-
rameter k and scale parameter 1:
=GammaInv(Rand(),k,1) .
Computing gamma variates: Python In
Python, the line
x = numpy.random.gamma(k,1,t)
generates a vector x of t independent random vari-
ates, each distributed in accordance with a gamma
distribution with shape parameter k and scale fac-
tor 1.
Similarly, in Python it is easy to compute an ar-
ray of t random variables each equal to two times a
binomial random variable with mean k/2 and prob-
ability p = 1/2:
x = 2*numpy.random.binomial(k,0.5,t)
Software for Bayesian audits Open-source
code implementing and illustrating Bayesian audits
is available on github 3.
Code for Bayesian audits that was developed for
potential use in the 2016 Australian Senate elec-
tions is described by Chilingirian [8], and is avail-
able on github 4.
3https://github.com/ron-rivest/audit-lab
4https://github.com/berjc/aus-senate-audit
B.7 Accuracy
The number of “test vote tallies” that need to be
generated depends on how much accuracy you may
wish to have in the computation of the probability
that the reported contest outcome is wrong. We
recommend using 1,000,000 test vote tallies for high
accuracy, although a Bayesian audit may work well
with many fewer (say 1,000).
B.8 Relation to frequentist risk-limiting
audits
Standard risk-limiting audits are based on the
Wald’s Sequential Probability Ratio Test. It is in-
teresting to note that such methods can be viewed
as Bayesian methods—see, for example, Berger [4].
We omit details here.
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